University of Cincinnati Law Review
Volume 82

Issue 3

Article 2

August 2018

Against Juvenile Sex Offender Registration
Catherine L. Carpenter

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr

Recommended Citation
Catherine L. Carpenter, Against Juvenile Sex Offender Registration, 82 U. Cin. L. Rev. 747 (2018)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol82/iss3/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and
Publications. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Cincinnati Law Review by an authorized editor of
University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications. For more information, please contact
ronald.jones@uc.edu.

Carpenter: Against Juvenile Sex Offender Registration

AGAINST JUVENILE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION
CatherineL. Carpenter*

Imagine if you were held accountable the rest of your life for something
you did as a child?
This is the Child Scarlet Letter in force: kids who commit criminal
sexual acts when they are children, but who, as adults, pay the price
with burdens of sex offender registrationandpublic notification. And in
a game of "how low can you go?, " states haveforced children as young
as nine and ten years old onto state sex offender registries, some with
registrationrequirementsthat extend the rest of their lives.
No matter the constitutionality of adult sex offender registration-and
on that point, there is debate-this Article argues that juvenile sex
offender registration violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
against cruel and unusualpunishment. "Once a sex offender, always a
sex offender" is not an appropriateslogan when dealing with children
who commit sexual offenses. Low recidivism rates and varied reasons
for the misconduct demonstrate that a child's criminal act does not
necessarilyportendfuture predatory behavior. And with a net cast so
wide it ensnares equally the child who rapes and the child who engages
in sex with an underage partner, juvenile sex offender registration
schemes are not moored to their civil regulatory intent.
Compounding the problem is automatic hfetime registrationfor child
offenders. This Article analogizes this practice to juvenile sentences of
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, which the Supreme
Court declared unconstitutional in Miller v. Alabama and Graham v.
Florida. It argues that mandatory lifetime registration applied to
children in the same manner as adults is cruel and unusualpunishment
because it violates fundamental principles that require sentencing
practices to distinguish between adult and child offenders.
Scrutiny of child sex offender registration laws placesfront and center
the issue of what it means to judge our children. And on that issue, we
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arefailing. The public's desire to punish children appearsfixed despite
our understanding that child sexual offenders pose little danger of
recidivism, possess diminished culpability, and have the capacity for
rehabilitation. In a debate clouded by emotion, it is increasingly clear
thatjuvenile sex offender registrationis cruel and unusualpunishment.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Imagine if you were held accountable the rest of your lfe for
somethingyou did as a child?
That is what happened to Leah,' who at ten years old, "flashed" her
eight and five-year-old stepbrothers and simulated the sex act with them
while they were fully clothed.2 Growing up in another generation,
1. This Article does not use the last names of child registrants. But Leah, herself, made the
decision to go public in the blog she started while in college. See Leah DuBuc, So, Who is Leah DuBuc
COLLEGE,
VALLEY
COMMUNITY
KALAMAZOO
Anyway?,
http://classes.kvcc.edulengl55/21410/1dubuc/allabout-me.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2014) (describing
her life as a child registrant).
2. See Martha T. Moore, Sex Crimes Break the Lock on Juvenile Records, USA TODAY (July
PM),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-07-10-juvenile10,
2006,
10:57
offendersx.htm?csp=34 (describing the impact of registration laws on child offenders); see also Katie
Walmsley, NJ Case Raises Questions about Meghan's Laws: Case of Horseplay or Serious Sexual
Misconduct?, ABC NEWS (July 27, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/US/nj-case-raises-questions-meghans-
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Leah's actions may have been considered "playing doctor," 3 but not by
today's standards. Leah was convicted of criminal sexual conduct' and
placed on the state's public sex offender registry when she was twelve
years old.5 The Child Scarlet Letter, if you will. 6
In her college blog, Leah detailed the impact that sex offender
registration has had upon her life. Not surprising, it has included loss of
college internships, difficulty in finding a place to live, bullying from
dorm mates, and loss of employment.7
No matter her acts of
volunteerism or her level of education, Leah will be required to remain
on the state registry until she is thirty-seven years old.8 Even after she is
no longer required to register, Leah will still have to contend with the
lasting vestiges of Internet public notification. This is because
information disseminated via the Internet is really not possible to delete.
It is forever "etched in cyberspace." 9 And Leah must endure these
hardships all because of an act she committed when she was ten years
old.
For other child offenders, the consequences can be more devastating.

laws/story?id=14171897&page=2 (recounting the harm done to juvenile registrants). In her college
blog, Leah refutes the charges that were leveled against her. See DuBuc, supra note 1.
3. "Playing Doctor" is a term coined to describe children's exploration of each other's genitals
and is considered by child psychologists as a normal occurrence among young children. See, e.g., Is
Your
Preschooler
Playing
Doctor?,
FAMILY
EDUCATION,
http://life.familyeducation.com/sexuality/toddler/53839.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2014) (acknowledging
normal sexual curiosity among children); see also GenitalPlay: What's Normal, What's Not, ASK DR.
SEARS: THE TRUSTED RESOURCE FOR PARENTS, http://www.askdrsears.com/topics/child-rearing-anddevelopmeht/sexuality/genital-play-whats-normal-whats-not (last visited Jan. 28, 2014) (offering criteria
for which sexual play is normal and which sexual play is not); Jose I. Concepcion, Understanding
Preadolescent Sexual Offenders, 78 FLA. B.J 30, 33 (July/Aug. 2004) ("Sexual play by developing
children-'playing doctor'-is normal and not a cause for concern.").
4. For ease of readability, this Article uses the term 'convicted' and 'adjudicated'
interchangeably in discussing a child offender's adjudication of delinquency.
5. See Moore, supra note 2 (reporting that Leah's request to be placed on a nonpublic registry
was denied by the court because her offense was aggravated by the fact that one of her stepbrothers was
more than five years younger than she was at the time of the alleged incident); see also Human Rights
Watch, Sex Offender Laws and Child Offenders, in No EASY ANSWERS: SEX OFFENDER LAWS IN THE
US
71
(2007)
[hereinafter
No
EASY
ANSWERS],
available
at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us09O7webwcover.pdf (detailing the lingering impact of
registration laws on a ten year old boy who sexually abused his six year old sister).
6. The 'scarlet letter' refers to Nathaniel Hawthorne's novel by the same name, published in
1850, involving an adulterous relationship between a married woman and a young minister, for which
the heroine is forced to wear a scarlet letter around her neck upon discovery of the affair. See
NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER (New York, Fleet Press Corp. 1969) (inviting the
reader to criticize the Puritanical practice of shaming the adulteress).
7. DuBuc, supra note I (describing the effect of public notification on her life).
8. See Moore, supra note 2 (quoting Leah as saying, "Look at everything I've done. Let me go
on with my life.").
9. Doe v. Dist. Att'y, 932 A.2d 552, 568 n.21 (Me. 2007) (Alexander and Silver, JJ.,
concurring), overruledby State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4 (Me. 2009).
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Registration and notification burdens continue for lifelo and often
without any legal avenue to remove the child from the registry." As
one Minnesota trial court commented in ordering lifetime registration
for an eleven-year-old child, "Registration [for life] as a predatory
offender may seem to be a harsh collateral consequence for an eleven
year old boy."l 2
Leah represents one type of child registrant: the child charged with
the sexual abuse of other children.13 But the registry is not limited to
those offenders. Registration is also required for children who engage in
voluntary sexual intercourse with other children.14 Such is the situation
involving J.L., who, at fourteen, had voluntary sexual intercourse with
his twelve-year-old girlfriend.' 5 Ironically, under controlling South
Dakota law, had the girl been thirteen years of age, J.L.'s act would

10. See, e.g., In re J.R.Z., 648 N.W.2d 241, 245 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (upholding registration of
eleven year old); In re J.W., 204 Ill.2d 50 (Ill. 2003) (affirming lifetime registration for a twelve-yearold adjudicated delinquent). For a full exploration of the damaging effects of child registration see
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, RAISED ON THE REGISTRY: THE IRREPARABLE HARM OF PLACING CHILDREN
ON SEX OFFENDER REGISTRIES IN THE U.S. (2013) [hereinafter RAISED ON THE REGISTRY], availableat

http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us05l3_ForUploadl.pdf (profiling Jacob C. who, at
eleven years old, touched his sister's genitals, and who was made to register as a sex offender for life);
id. at 35 (recounting the story of T.T. who was found guilty of aggravated sexual assault for inserting a
feminine hygiene product in his six-year-old half-brother's anus and forced to register for life).
11. See RAISED ON THE REGISTRY, supra note 10, at 49 (interviewing Gabriel P. who, at ten
years old, was subject to lifetime registration for an incident that involved touching a seven year old).
For constitutional scrutiny of such practice, see People ex rel. ZB., 757 N.W.2d 595, 597 (S.D. 2008)
(declaring that South Dakota law was unconstitutional for requiring a fifteen year old to remain on the
sex offender registry for life when adults who committed the same offense were able to have their
names removed if they obtained a suspended imposition of sentence). See generally Krista L. Schram,
The Needfor Heightened ProceduralDue ProcessProtection in Juvenile Sex Offender Adjudications in
South Dakota:An Analysis of the People in the Interest of Z.B., 55 S.D. L. REv. 99 (2010) (arguing that
the lack of individualized assessment results in denial of procedural due process rights for child
adjudicated offenders).
12. In re J.R.Z., 648 N.W.2d at 245.
13. See RAISED ON THE REGISTRY, supra note 10, at 28 ("Child sex offenses range from 'sharing
pornography with younger children, fondling a child over the clothes, [and] grabbing peers in a sexual
way at school, [to] date rape, gang rape, or performing oral, vaginal, or anal sex on a much younger
child."') (quoting David Finkelhor, Richard Ormrod & Mark Chaffin, Juveniles Who Commit Sex
Offenses Against Minors, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE JUVENILE JUSTICE BULLETIN 3 (Dec. 2009),

availableat http://www.unh.edu/ccrc/pdf/CV17I.pdf).
14. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Wilson, 652 S.E.2d 501, 520 (Ga. 2007) (concerning seventeen-yearold Genarlow Wilson who engaged in consensual oral sex with a fifteen-year-old girl); see also In re
H.V., No. A06-1214, 2007 WL 1599207 (Minn. Ct. App. June 5, 2007) (involving a fifteen year old
who engaged in sexual intercourse with a thirteen year old).. Although tried as an adult, teenager Ricky
Blackman was considered a sexually violent offender under Oklahoma law for having sexual relations
with his underage girlfriend. See also Emanuella Grinberg, No Longer a Registered Sex Offender, but
AM),
2010,
6:41
11,
(Feb.
CNN.coM
Remains,
Stigma
the
http://www.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/02/11/oklahoma.teen.sex.offender (chronicling Ricky Blackman's
conviction as an adult offender for having sex with an underage girl when he was sixteen years old).
15. People ex rel. J.L., 800 N.W.2d 720 (S.D. 2011).
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have been considered a misdemeanor 6 because of lenient "Romeo and
Juliet"17 statutory rape laws.' 8 However, because the girl was twelve
years old, J.L.'s act was deemed an aggravated sexual offense,
automatically subjecting him to lifetime registration as a sex offender.' 9
J.L.'s treatment is not unique. Registry rolls are filled with children
who commit voluntary, but presumed criminal, sexual acts with other
minors and who, because of those acts, are required to register as sex
offenders.20
Characterizing J.L.'s act as an aggravated sexual offense is best
understood against the backdrop of the federal Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), which Congress enacted in
2006 as part of a comprehensive system of sex offender registration and
notification.21 SORNA reclassified registration, dividing offenders into
three categories or "tiers" based solely on the crimes they committed.2 2
Rather than assessing an offender's future dangerousness on an
16. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-7 (2013) (providing that "[i]f the victim is at least thirteen
years of age and the actor is less than five years older than the victim, the actor is guilty of a Class I
misdemeanor"); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1407(F) (2013) (allowing a defense to sexual
conduct with a minor if "the defendant is under nineteen years of age or attending high school and is no
more than twenty-four months older than the victim and the conduct is consensual").
17. For a comparison of Romeo and Juliet to teenagers having consensual sex today, see Steve
James, Romeo and Juliet Were Sex Offenders: An Analysis of the Age of Consent and a Call For
Reform, 78 UMKC L. REV. 241, 241 (2009) ("While the idea of Romeo and Juliet being prosecuted as
sex offenders may seem absurd, the reality is that it has happened and could happen to many modem
teens.").
18. See generally Catherine L. Carpenter, On Statutory Rape, Strict Liability, and the Public
Welfare Offense Model, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 313, 341 (2003) (tracking states with less stringent
punishment where the age differential between perpetrator and victim is less than three or four years).
For an example of a state statutory rape statute with age differentials, see ALASKA STAT.
§ 11.41.436(a)(1) (2013) (charging as a Class B felony sexual abuse of a victim who is between thirteen
and fifteen by one who is at least seventeen years of age); ALASKA STAT. §I 1.41.440(a)(1) (2013)
(charging as Class A misdemeanor sexual abuse of a victim who is under the age of thirteen by one who
is less than sixteen years old).
19. People ex rel. JL., 800 N.W.2d 720.
20. See, e.g., In re T.W., 291 Ill. App.3d 955, 959 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (concerning consensual
sexual relationship between minors where court rejected the accused male's argument that registration
statute was vague as to which of the two participants should be required to register); In re H.V., No.
A06-1214, 2007 WL 1599207 (Minn. Ct. App. June 5, 2007) (involving a fifteen year old who engaged
in sexual intercourse with a thirteen year old); RAISED ON THE REGISTRY, supra note 10, at 38. But see
In re D.B., 950 N.E.2d 528, 533 (Ohio 2011) (finding OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(A)(1)(b) (West
2008) unconstitutionally vague as applied to a thirteen-year-old who was required to register as a sex
offender for engaging in sexual conduct with an eleven-year-old).
21. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 16911-16929 (2012). SORNA was enacted as part of the Adam Walsh
Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (2006). The Act also
established a national sex offender registry, which is accessible by the public via a website. Id.

§§ 16919-16920.

22. 42 U.S.C. § 16911 (2012). See Chrysanthi Leon, David L. Burton & Diana Alvare, NetWidening in Delaware: The Overuse of Registration and Residential Treatmentfor Youth Who Commit
Sex Offenses, 17 WIDENER L. REV. 127, 133 (2011) (criticizing the current system for its use of
psychological evaluation only for treatment and not for tier placement).
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individualized basis, SORNA requires that the conviction alone
determines the registrant's classification, and from that classification
flow the burdens associated with registration and notification.23
Not only did SORNA change the classification of offenders, the
federal scheme also subjected child sex offenders in the juvenile justice
system to the same registration and notification burdens as their adult
counterparts. 24
Interestingly, although SORNA only mandated
registration for those fourteen years or older, states have passed sex
offender registration laws requiring children far younger to register.2 5
As an incentive for states to implement the program, SORNA dictated a
loss of federal funding in the event a state failed to comply with the
requirements. 26
Adult and child registrants also face ever-changing and increasingly
harsh registration rules, and should they relocate to another state, they
must navigate conflicting registration schemes at the risk of penalties for
the failure to register.28 Consider Jacob C., who at eleven years old
committed a sexual act against his younger sister. He touched her
genitals.29 Because of that act, Jacob lost his freedom; he was placed in
23. See, e.g., State v. Bodyke, 933 N.E.2d 753, 759 (Ohio 2010) (explaining that "offenders
[under SORNA] are classified as Tier I, Tier II, or Tier III sex offenders . .. based solely on the
offender's offense").
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 16911(8) (defining the term "convicted" to include "adjudicated delinquent
as a juvenile for that offense, but only if the offender is 14 years of age or older at the time of the
offense"). For an interesting story on one person who pushed for national juvenile registration, see
Moore, supra note 2 (highlighting the story of Amie Zyla, age 18, who advocated for the release of
information pertaining to child offenders).
25. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-208.26(a) (West 2012) (declaring that when a juvenile
is adjudicated delinquent for a violation of one of the enumerated offenses, "and the juvenile was at least
eleven years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, the court shall consider whether the
juvenile is a danger to the community," and if so, the court may require the juvenile to register); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 46-23-502(10) (2013) (stating that a "sexual or violent offender" includes any person
who, in youth court, has been found to have committed or been adjudicated for a sexual or violent
offense, which demonstrates no differentiation in the treatment of juveniles and adults); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 938.34(15m)(1) (West 2013) (indicating that a juvenile adjudicated delinquent for any violation,
solicitation, conspiracy, or attempt to commit any enumerated violation may be required to comply with
the same reporting requirements as adults if the court determines that there was an underlying sexual
motivation).
26. See 42 U.S.C. § 16925(a) (2012) (legislating that states would lose ten percent of certain
federal funding if SORNA were not adopted).
27. See, e.g., Starkey v. Okla. Dep't of Corrs., 305 P.3d 1004 (Okla. 2013) (reviewing the
increasing registration requirements undertaken by the State of Oklahoma over a ten year period);
Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 374-77 (Ind. 2009) (examining the myriad of continuously-changing
Indiana statutes in the previous decade); accordState v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 8-11 (Me. 2009).
28. See, e.g., In re Shaquille O'Neal B., 684 S.E.2d 549 (S.C. 2009) (highlighting the disparate
treatment in registration of adjudicated child sex offender who moved from North Carolina to South
Carolina and the resulting confusion he faced in discerning the registration requirements because of the
move); see also Grinberg,supra note 14 (tracing the harsh requirements Ricky Blackman faced when he
moved to Oklahoma despite the expungement of his conviction in Iowa).
29. See RAISED ON THE REGISTRY, supra note 10 (arguing that public registration laws
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a juvenile home and not allowed to live with his sister who was also his
victim. His actions continued to have life-altering consequences when
he moved from Michigan to Florida at eighteen to start fresh.3 0 Jacob
had great difficulty understanding Florida's registration burdens and
even greater difficulty meeting the state's changing residency
restrictions. 3 1 Ultimately, he was arrested and convicted of the felony of
failure to register. 32 All because of a criminal act that Jacob committed
when he was eleven years old.
This is the Child Scarlet Letter in force. Kids like Leah, J.L., and
Jacob C. who engage in criminal sexual acts when they are children, but
who, as adults, pay the price with burdens of registration and
notification originally intended for adult offenders.3 3 And in a game of
"how low can you go?," 34 states have forced children as young as nine
and ten years old onto state sex offender registries,35 some for the rest of
their lives.36
irrevocably impact the lives of children who are required to register as sex offenders).
30. Id. at 1-2 (chronicling the legal troubles Jacob C. had in discerning the registration
requirements when he moved from Michigan to Florida).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See U.S. v. Juvenile Male, 590 F.3d 924, 927 (9th Cir. 2010), vacated, 131 S. Ct. 2860
(2011) (recognizing "the brunt of SORNA's retroactive application to juvenile offenders is felt mainly
by adults who committed offenses long ago as teenagers-many of whom have built families, homes,
and careers notwithstanding their history of juvenile delinquency, which before SORNA's enactment
was not a matter of public record"); see also In re J.R.Z, 648 N.W.2d 241, 249 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002)
(inviting the legislature "to review the prudence of requiring all juveniles adjudicated for criminal sexual
conduct to register as predatory sex offenders"). Registration affects not only currently adjudicated
children; it also affects adults previously adjudicated as delinquents. See, e.g., U.S. v. W.B.H., 664 F.3d
848 (11th Cir. 2011) (requiring registration post-SORNA and twenty years after child's delinquency
adjudication).
METROLYRICS,
Rock
Lyrics,
34. See
Chubby
Checker-Limbo
http://www.metrolyrics.com/limbo-rock-lyrics-chubby-checker.html
(last visited Jan. 28 2014)
(referencing an oldie-but-goodie phrase from the lyrics of Limbo Rock popularized by singer Chubby
Checker). On Michigan's practice to register children as young as nine years old, see Juveniles Crowd
Michigan Sex Offender Registry, SEX OFFENDER REPORTS, CHARTS AND OTHER PAPERS (May 3, 2012),

(noting
http://sexoffender-reports.blogspot.com/2012/05/juveniles-crowd-michigan-sex-offender.html
that Michigan's youngest registered sex offenders are nine years old); see also SC Supreme Court OKs
2013),
WIS
TV
(Aug.
12,
Sex
Offender
Registration,
Juvenile
http://www.wistv.com/Global/story.asp?s=1398401&clienttype (reporting on the unanimous ruling by
the court that requiring a nine year old to register does not violate the child's due process rights).
35. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 243.166(6)(d) (West 2013) (precluding any exception from
lifetime predatory sex offender registration for juveniles under the age of 14); In re Ronnie A., 585
S.E.2d 311 (S.C. 2003) (holding that registration of nine year old did not violate due process). See also
RAISED ON THE REGISTRY, supra note 10, at 33 (explaining that eight of those interviewed were 10 or
younger "with the youngest being 9 years old"). One interviewee, Max B., started registration at ten
years old for having inappropriately touched his eight year old sister. Id. at 33.
36. See, e.g., In re J.R.Z., 648 N.W.2d 241 (classifying an eleven year old as a sexual predator
for the rest of his life); In re J.W., 204 1lI.2d 50, 65 (Ill. 2003) (upholding lifetime registration for a
twelve-year-old boy who had sexual contact with another boy); see also Caitlin Dickson, Barely a
2013),
(Sept.
3,
THESE
TIMES
Life,
IN
and
Marked for
Teenager
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It is an obvious truth that children are different from adults. Indeed,
the juvenile justice system is based on that premise, and recent Supreme
Court decisions have highlighted those differences in holding that
juveniles are not deserving of the death penalty37 or life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole.3 8 Yet, under the federal mandate of
SORNA, these differences are ignored. Children are treated like their
adult counterparts, forced to endure harsh registration3 9 and notification
burdens 40 not contemplated by the juvenile justice system.4 1
This Article asserts that child registration and public notification run
counter to the prevailing and fundamental policies of rehabilitation and
http://inthesetimes.com/article/6334/barely_ateenagerandmarkedforlife
(describing the struggle
faced by a registrant who was required to register for life on Iowa's public sex offender registry because
at thirteen years old, he told his four-year-old cousin to expose herself).
37. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding the death penalty unconstitutional
when applied to a minor convicted of murder).
38. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (determining that it was unconstitutional to
sentence juveniles to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole in homicide cases); see also
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (finding that life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole was unconstitutional when applied to a juvenile convicted of a nonhomicide offense).
39. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 16915-115(a)(3) (2012) (stating that a Tier III sex offender shall keep
his or her registration current for life); 42 U.S.C. § 16916-116(3) (2012) (requiring that a Tier III sex
offender must appear in person to have his or her current photograph taken, and verify the registration
information not less frequently than every three months). For examples of state codifications of
SORNA, see ALA. CODE 1975 § 15-20A-28(a) (2013) (mandating that a juvenile adjudicated delinquent
who was fourteen or older at the time of an offense enumerated in subsection (a) shall be subject to
registration and notification, if applicable, for life); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.0435(11) (West 2013)
(obliging a juvenile adjudicated delinquent to maintain registration for the duration of his or her life);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4906(b)(1)(H) (2013) (declaring that a juvenile sex offender fourteen years of age
or older must register for life); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11 -704.1(e) (2013) (explaining that a
juvenile registrant must "appear in person at a location designated by the Department of Juvenile
Services every 3 months" to update registration and have a photograph taken); MINN. STAT. § 243.166
subdiv. 6(d) (2013) (asserting that a person must register for life if he has been adjudicated delinquent
for any enumerated offense for which registration is required and he has a prior adjudication for an
offense for which registration was required).
40. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-8404 (2013) (declaring that the Idaho state police shall establish
and maintain a separate registry of juvenile sex offenders including registrants' fingerprints,
photographs, and other information, which "is subject to release to criminal justice agencies pursuant to
section 18-8305, Idaho Code, and to the public pursuant to section 18-8323, Idaho Code"); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 62F.260 (2012) ("The records relating to a child must not be sealed pursuant to the provisions
of NRS 62H.100 to 62H.170, inclusive, while the child is subject to registration and community
notification as a juvenile sex offender pursuant to NRS 179D.010 to 179D.550, inclusive."); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 46-23-508(3) (2013) (stating that "[d]issemination to the public of information allowed or
required by this section may be done by newspaper, paper flyers, the internet, or any other media
determined by the disseminating entity," and that the disseminating entity should consider the offender's
level of risk to the public); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 301.45(2) (2013) (noting that "[t]he department shall
maintain a registry of all persons subject to sub. (1g)" including the person's name and all aliases, date
of birth, gender, race, height, weight, hair and eye color, the address of the person's residence, email
addresses, name and address of the person's employment, and the name and location of the person's
school, among other information).
41. See infra Part II.B (describing the clash of policies between SORNA and those in the
juvenile justice system).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol82/iss3/2

8

Carpenter: Against Juvenile Sex Offender Registration

2014]

AGAINST JUVENILE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION

755

confidentiality of the juvenile justice system.42 Even if one were to
argue that child offender registration satisfies important policy
considerations of public safety and protection of child victims, the
automatic nature of child registration does not. The current model of
"conviction based assessment" required under SORNA 43-where the
nature of the conviction determines future dangerousness of the actoris unsound when applied to child offenders because their commission of
sex crimes does not necessarily portend predatory behavior."
It is not just the nature of automatic registration that causes concern.
Depending on the triggering offense, a child offender might also be
subjected to mandatory registration for life.45 This Article draws a
parallel between mandatory registration for life and life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole, which the Court in Graham v.
Florida46 and Miller v. Alabama47 found to be cruel and unusual
punishment because such a sentence treated juvenile conduct as
unredeemable and without the possibility of rehabilitation. 48 So too is
mandatory lifetime registration. A lifetime registration requirement is
42. See infra Part H.A (reviewing the fundamental tenets of the juvenile justice system).
43. See 42 U.S.C. § 16911(1)-(4) (2012) (classifying sex offenders in one of three tiers by the
crime committed); see also U.S. v. Parks, 698 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2012) ("By its own terms, SORNA's
registration requirements applied automatically to individuals who commit a triggering sexual
offense .... ). Courts have commented on the impact of conviction-based assessment. See, e.g., State
v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108, 1113 (Ohio 2011) (observing that, under Ohio's amended sex offender
statute, offenders were no longer entitled to a hearing to determine whether they would be classified as a
sexually oriented offender, habitual sex offender, or sexual predator); Commonwealth v. Baker, 295
S.W.3d 437, 446 (Ky. 2009) (noting that Kentucky's residency restrictions apply to certain offenders
without an individualized assessment of whether they would be a danger to children).
44. See infra Part V.
45. See 42 U.S.C. § 16915(a)(3) (2012) (declaring that a Tier HI sex offender shall keep
registration current for "the life of the offender"). For examples of state codifications of SORNA, see
CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.008(a) (2007) (noting that "any person who, on or after 01/01/1986 is
discharged or paroled from the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation after having been
adjudicated a ward of the juvenile court because of the commission or attempted commission of any
offense described ... shall register as a sex offender"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4906(h) (2013)
(requiring that an offender over the age of fourteen years shall register for life who is adjudicated as a
juvenile offender for an act, which if committed by an adult would constitute a sexually violent crime
set forth in KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4902(c) (2013) and such crime is an "off-grid felony or felony ranked
in severity level I of the nondrug grid").
46. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (offering reasons why juveniles deserve less serious punishment than
their adult counterparts in nonhomicide cases).
47. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (presenting the rationales for why life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole is not appropriate for juvenile offenders in homicide cases).
48. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460 (holding that mandatory life without parole for offenders under
the age of eighteen at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment.); see also Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030 (describing life without parole as an
"irrevocable judgment"); cf Moore v. Biter, 725 F.3d 1184, 1189 (9th Cir. 2013) (explaining that a
juvenile sex offender's sentencing of 254 years in prison is irreconcilable with Graham's mandate);
accord People v. Caballero, 282 P.3d 291 (Cal. 2012) (concluding that a juvenile's sentence of 110
years violated Graham).
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an official pronouncement that the child remains a continual danger for
life without any possibility of rehabilitation. 4 9

No doubt, there are hurdles to overcome in arguing that child sex
offender registration is cruel and unusual punishment. Generally, sex
offender registration laws have been treated as civil regulations, and as
such, they are not governed by the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on
cruel and unusual punishment.5 0 Nor has the stigma associated with
registration been deemed sufficient to constitute punishment5 1 or a
denial of the registrant's due process rights. 52
Labeling the registration scheme as a civil regulation-a bar to a
viable challenge under the Eighth Amendment-is one hurdle to
overcome. However, more challenging than this legal obstacle is the
inability to counter the emotion that grips the debate.5 3 The impetus to
register children, even in the face of compelling arguments and statistics
to the contrary, convincingly demonstrates that emotions control the
legislative agenda.54 Faulty assumptions regarding high recidivism rates
49. Two recent state supreme courts have come to the conclusion that automatic lifetime
registration is unconstitutional for child offenders. See In re C.P., 967 N.E.2d 729 (Ohio 2012)
(concluding that the mandatory aspect of the statute was unconstitutional); see also N.L. v. State, 989
N.E.2d 773 (Ind. 2013) (rejecting automatic registration for life, requiring instead clear and convincing
evidence before a child will be required to register for life). Also, in a groundbreaking ruling in
Pennsylvania, Court of Common Pleas Judge Uhler found that the state's requirement of lifetime
registration for juveniles convicted of certain sexual offenses violates juveniles' rights under various
provisions of the Pennsylvania and U.S. Constitutions, as well as Pennsylvania's Juvenile Act. See In re
J.B., No. CP-67-JV-0000726-2010 (Penn. Ct. Coin. Pl. Nov. 4,2013).
50. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."). See In re C.P., 967 N.E.2d 729, 753 (Ohio 2012)
(O'Donnell, J., dissenting) (chastising the majority for its lack of analysis on whether Ohio's registration
scheme was a civil or criminal penalty before it found an Eighth Amendment violation).
51. See infra Part III (discussing the stigmatizing impact of registration and notification).
52. See, e.g., State v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 306 P.3d 369 (Nev. 2013) (concluding that invoking
retroactive application of sex offender registration on child registrant does not violate the Due Process
clause); see also U.S. v. Ambert, 561 F.3d 1202, 1209 (11th Cir. 2009) (rejecting substantive due
process challenge because sex offenders do not have a fundamental right to avoid publicity); U.S. v.
Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d 999, 1012 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding that individuals convicted of serious sex
offenses do not have a fundamental right to be free from sex offender registration requirements because
those requirements serve a "legitimate nonpunitive purpose of public safety, which is advanced by
alerting the public to the risk of sex offenders in the community").
53. See Catherine L. Carpenter, Legislative Epidemics: A Cautionary Tale of CriminalLaws that
Have Swept the Country, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 18-32 (2010) (tracing the emotionally-charged rhetoric
that surrounded the origins of adult sex offender registration laws).
54. See infra Part II.C. (describing the societal panic that has developed in the discussion of sex
offenders). One indication that emotion, rather than sound reasoning, controls the legislation is that
registration schemes are ineffective deterrent measures. See, e.g., Molly J. Walker Wilson, The
Expansion of Criminal Registries and the Illusion of Control, 73 LA. L. REV. 509 (2013) (claiming that
registries are misguided attempts to control and quell anxiety); Michele L. Earl-Hubbard, The Child Sex
Offender Registration Laws: The Punishment, Liberty Deprivation,and Unintended Results Associated
with the Scarlet Letter Laws of the 1990s, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 788, 853-54 (1996) (asserting that
notification laws create a false sense of security in the community because of the inherent voluntariness
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and future dangerousness only fan the flames.ss
Part II of this Article frames the clash of policies between the juvenile
justice system and SORNA. On one side are the juvenile justice
system's long-standing policies to promote rehabilitation and protect the
child's privacy interests.5 6 In direct conflict are SORNA's requirements
of mandatory registration of children and public notification of their
confidential adjudications. This Part will explore both the legal and
emotional reasons why the tension between competing statutory aims
has been settled in favor of SORNA.
Part III outlines the devastating and stigmatizing impact of
registration and notification on the child offender. It traces the practical
implications of life as a child registrant, including the inability of the
child to live with family, the bar to future educational goals, the
impediment of a career, and most devastating, the ostracism and
isolation from peers.
The balance of the Article analyzes child sex offender registration
laws within a constitutional framework. Although they are potentially
unconstitutional under principles of ex post facto and substantive and
this Article explores only their
procedural due process,5
constitutionality under the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment.
Part IV argues that child sex offender registration is a criminal
penalty cast as a civil regulation and is therefore subject to Eighth
of the system). Interestingly, the U.S. Government Accountability Office reports that there have been
no studies on the effects on public safety following enactment of the laws. See U.S. Gov'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-211, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION ACr:
JURISDICTIONS FACE CHALLENGES TO IMPLEMENTING THE ACT, AND STAKEHOLDERS REPORT POSITIVE

AND NEGATIVE EFFECTS (2013), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/652033.pdf.
55. See infra Part II.C.
56. See infra Part II.A (tracing the development of the juvenile justice system).
57. Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999 (Alaska 2008) (finding that ASORA's registration requirements
violates the ex post facto clause of state constitution); accord Doe v. Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr.
Servs., 40 A.3d 39 (Md. 2013); Commonwealth v. Baker, 295 S.W.3d 437 (Ky. 2009); F.R. v. St.
Charles Cnty. Sheriffs Dept., 301 S.W.3d 56 (Mo. 2010). See also State v. Briggs, 199 P.3d 935 (Utah
2008) (holding that statute allowing the Department to publish offender's primary and secondary targets
violated due process if defendant was not provided with a hearing on whether he was currently
dangerous). For an argument on the constitutionality of sex offender registration laws under ex post
facto and substantive due process principles, see generally Catherine L. Carpenter & Amy E. Beverlin,
The Evolution of Unconstitutionalityin Sex Offender RegistrationLaws, 63 HASTINGS L. J. 1071 (2012).
58. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."). Indeed, a compelling argument can be made that child
registration violates substantive due process under Rochin v. Cahfornia, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), which
requires that the government activity "shock the conscience." Id. at 172. No greater evidence of this
test exists than the look on the faces of those with whom I share the current state of law regarding the
registration and notification burdens that children endure. Whether it is my law students or audiences I
address, the reaction is the same: all are surprised and saddened to learn that children are required to
register as sex offenders.
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Amendment analysis. Employing the multi-factored test from Kennedy
v. Mendoza-Martinez,59 this Part asserts that child sex offender
registration is not a civil regulation because registration is no longer
rationally connected to its civil intent. Specifically, with respect to child
offenders, child sex offender registration is excessive legislation because
it is predicated on the misguided premise that a child's sexual crime
signifies future dangerousness as an adult.6 0
Assuming registration is punishment, Part V makes the case that,
under the Eighth Amendment, child registration violates the prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment. First, this Part tracks the national
consensus against child registration, and then under independent

analysis, it demonstrates that automatic registration is excessive
legislative drafting. One size does not fit all when it comes to the
registration of children who commit sexual offenses.
Compounding the problem is automatic lifetime registration for child
offenders. Part V analogizes this practice to juvenile sentences of life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole, which the Supreme
Court declared unconstitutional in Miller v. Alabama and Graham v.
Florida. Mandatory lifetime registration applied to children in the same
manner as adult offenders is cruel and unusual punishment because it
violates fundamental principles that require sentencing practices to
distinguish between adult and child offenders. 6 1
For kids like Leah, J.L., and Jacob C., the 'Scarlet Letter' is not
fiction. Nor is it an exaggeration of the stigma and isolation they face
on a daily basis. No matter the constitutionality of adult sex offender
registration-and on that point, there is debate-this Article concludes
that the current system of child sex offender registration is cruel and
unusual punishment.
II. COMPETING GOALS OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM AND
REGISTRATION OF CHILD SEX OFFENDERS

A delinquency adjudication coupled with the requirement that the
child must register as a sex offender is in striking juxtaposition. The
adjudication is a confidential resolution combined with an adult and
public consequence. The joining of the private and the public is more

59. 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963) (articulating seven factors to be used to determine whether a
regulation is punitive).
60. See infra Part V (offering statistics to refute the perception that child offenders recidivate).
61. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2458 (2012) (declaring that a mandatory penalty
scheme that invokes such a harsh punishment "contravenes Graham (and also Roper's) foundational
principle: that imposition of a State's most severe penalties on juvenile offenders cannot proceed as
though they were not children"). See also infra Part V.B.2 for a detailed discussion of the arguments.
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startling when we consider the long-standing history of treating child
offenders differently from their adult counterparts. 62
A. Fundamental Tenets of the Juvenile Justice System

From its founding, juvenile court was intended to be different from
adult court. 63 Unlike adult court Froceedings, which are adversarial in
nature and designed to punish, juvenile court was structured to
encourage treatment and rehabilitation.6 5 In noting the differences
between the two systems of justice, Judge Reinhardt wrote in United
States v. Juvenile Male that one is "public and punitive ... the other
largely confidential and rehabilitative." 66
It is not always easy to determine whether a child offender should
remain under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court or be transferred to
62. See U.S. v. Juvenile Male, 590 F.3d 924, 931 (9th Cir. 2010) (recalling the historical
distinctions between the two systems); accord In re W.Z., 957 N.E.2d 367, 371-72 (Ohio Ct. App.
2011).
63. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14 (1967) (emphasizing that "wide differences have been
tolerated-indeed insisted upon-between the procedural rights accorded to adults and those of
juveniles"); In re W.Z., 957 N.E.2d at 370 (explaining the differences between the adult criminal court
system versus the juvenile court system); People ex rel. Z.B., 757 N.W.2d 595, 606 (S.D. 2008) (Sabers,
J., dissenting) ("The juvenile justice system is premised on a rehabilitative theory of justice, much
unlike the harsher, more punitive adult system."). Scholars have also explored the distinction between
the two systems of justice. See, e.g., Linda M. B. Uttal & David H. Uttal, Children Are Not Little
Adults: Developmental Diferences and the Juvenile Justice System, 15 PUB. INT. L. REP. 234, 235
(2010) (urging that a "systematic reform is needed that recognizes the cognitive and emotional
differences between children and adults"); Megan F. Chaney, Keeping the Promise of Gault: Requiring
Post-AdjudicatoryJuvenile Defenders, 19 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 351, 354 (2012) (writing
that "[t]he first juvenile justice reformers envisioned a safe haven away from the confines and harshness
of adult court where less culpable youngsters could be rehabilitated to reenter society as productive,
lawabiding adults").
64. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005) (stressing the importance of rehabilitating
juveniles because "the character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult"); see generally
Jeffrey Fagan & Elizabeth Piper Deschenes, Criminology: Determinants of Judicial Waiver Decisions
for Violent Juvenile Offenders, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 314, 318-25 (1990) (addressing the goal
of adult court, which is to punish the offender); Jarod K. Hofacket, Comment, Justice or Vengeance:
How Young is Too Young for a Child to be Tried and Punished as an Adult?, 34 TEx. TECH. L. REv.
159, 162 (2002) (noting that the juvenile system revolves around rehabilitation while the adult systems
focuses on punishment).
65. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 31-10-2-1(5) (2013) (codifying the goals of the juvenile justice
system, which are to "ensure that children within the juvenile justice system are treated as persons in
need of care, protection, treatment, and rehabilitation"). See also Tonya K. Cole, Note, Counting
Juvenile Adjudications as Strikes Under California's 'Three Strikes' Law: An Undermining of the
Separateness of the Adult and Juvenile Systems, 19 J. JUv. L. 335, 336 (1998) (explaining that when
states followed Illinois's lead in 1899 in enacting juvenile codes, "the focus was not on guilt or
innocence as in the adult criminal system, but on reform and treatment").
66. U.S. v. Juvenile Male, 590 F.3d 924, 932 (9th Cir. 2009). See also Schall v. Martin, 467
U.S. 253, 263 (1984) ("The State has 'a parens patriae' interest in preserving and promoting the welfare
of the child' which makes a juvenile proceeding fundamentally different from an adult criminal trial.")
(internal citation omitted).
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adult court. In general, the juvenile court considers the following
factors: the juvenile's age and social background; the nature of the
alleged offense; the extent and nature of the juvenile's prior delinquency
record; the juvenile's intellectual development and psychological
maturity; the nature and success of past treatment efforts; and the
availability of programs to treat the juvenile's behavioral problems. 67
The belief that the juvenile justice system is best able to rehabilitate
child offenders is illustrated in the Ohio case of In re C.P., 68 in which
the state requested that C.P. be transferred to adult court to face
allegations of two counts of rape and one count of kidnapping with
sexual motivation. 69 Despite both the seriousness of the charges and a
previous adjudication of C.P., when he was eleven years old, for
sexually abusing his half-sister,70 the juvenile court rejected the state's
request, stating, "Ithink we have time within the juvenile system and we
have resources within the juvenile system to work with this boy." 7 1
Rehabilitation is the cornerstone of the juvenile justice system. In
describing its development, the Supreme Court wrote in its landmark
decision of In re Gault,72 "The apparent rigidities, technicalities, and
harshness, which [the reformers] observed in both substantive and
procedural criminal law were therefore to be discarded."73 Gault
represents one of four cases from the 1960s in which the Supreme Court
evaluated the balance of affording the juvenile offender due process
rights with the goal of maintaining a nonadversarial system. 74
Although Gault provided juveniles with certain constitutional
safeguards reserved for adults,75 it also upheld the guarantees of
67. See, e.g., U.S. v. Juvenile Male No. 1, 47 F.3d 68, 70 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting with approval
the district court's statement that "Congress has provided juvenile adjudication as an alternative to adult
prosecution. That reflects a hope that the disastrous effects of the environment in which I.R. has grown
can be reversed.").
68. In re C.P., 967 N.E.2d 729 (Ohio 2012).
69. Id. at 732.
70. Id. at 733.
71. Id. See also D.C. CODE § 16-2301(6) (2012) ("The term 'delinquent child' means a child
who has committed a delinquent act and is in need of care or rehabilitation.").
72. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1967) (balancing the policies of the juvenile justice system
with constitutional safeguards for juveniles).
73. Id. at 15. For an historical review of the juvenile justice system, see Barry C. Feld,
UnmitigatedPunishment: Adolescent Criminal Responsibility and LWOP Sentences, 10 J. L. & FAM.
STUD. 11, 13-16 (2007).
74. See Kent v. U.S., 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (holding that a waiver ofjurisdiction must be attended
by due process); Gault, 387 U.S. at 20 (concluding that juveniles were entitled to certain due process
rights afforded to adult criminals); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (requiring that a state must
show proof beyond a reasonable doubt for acts that would be considered a crime by an adult); McKeiver
v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (finding that juveniles do not have a right to a jury trial in juvenile
adjudications).
75. Gault, 387 U.S. at 31-58 (determining that juveniles are entitled to notice of the charges,
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confidentiality and privacy associated with the juvenile justice system. 6
These safeguards purposefully shield the child offender from the stigma
associated with the delinquency adjudication through confidential and
private proceedingS77 and through the expungement of evidence
pertaining to the arrest and delinquency.78
Unlike adult court proceedings, which demand public scrutiny and a
public trial because of retributive and penal results,79 juvenile court
proceedings are private and confidential to stimulate rehabilitation and
avoid the stigma attached to public condemnation. The child offender's
privacy is so zealously protected that the Federal Juvenile Delinquency
Act (FJDA), for example, expressly prohibits the use of the juvenile's
record for "employment, license, bonding, or any civil right or
privilege"80 and similarly provides that "neither the name nor picture of
any juvenile shall be made public in connection with a juvenile
delinquency proceeding."8' The belief is that maintaining the privacy of
the juvenile offender in proceedings that are confidential enables the
82
juvenile offender to avoid the stigma associated with the delinquency.
right to counsel, and the privilege against self-incrimination); accord In re W.Z., 957 N.E.2d 367, 371
(Ohio Ct. App. 2011) ("Although certain constitutional protections afforded adults, including notice,
confrontation, the right to counsel, the privilege against self-incrimination, and freedom from double
jeopardy, are applicable to juvenile proceedings, other protections, including trial by jury, are not.").
76. Gault, 387 U.S 1.
77. See, e.g., In re C.P., 967 N.E.2d 729, 745 (Ohio 2012) (emphasizing that "[c]onfidentiality
has always been at the heart of the juvenile justice system").
78. See, e.g., State v. Fletcher, 974 A.2d 188, 196 (Del. 2009) (describing the role of the
expungement statute in Delaware); State v. Giovanelli, 274 P.3d 18, 20-21 (Idaho Ct. App. 2012)
(examining the impact of purging the record on the state's attempt to transfer the juvenile to the adult
sex offender registry). For an interesting look at a child offender's desire to expunge his record only for
the purpose of obtaining removal from the registry, see State v. K.H., 860 N.E.2d 1284, 1286 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2007) ("It's not that I want to expunge the record, the fact is that I know what I did is
wrong.... [B]ut my main concern is getting it off the registry.").
79. See, e.g., In re J.S., 438 A.2d 1125, 1129 (Vt. 1981) (stating that the publication of a
juvenile's name could negatively impact the rehabilitative goals of the juvenile justice system and that
confidential proceedings protect juveniles from the stigma faced by similarly adjudicated adults); see
also Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile Justice Law Reform, 79
MINN. L. REV. 965, 1012 (1995) ("The juvenile component of offenders' criminal history often is not
available because of the confidentiality ofjuvenile court records .... ).
80. 18 U.S.C. § 5038(a) (2012) (prohibiting release of record except in limited circumstances);
accord Mo. REV. ANN. STAT. § 211.425(3) (2013) (declaring that juveniles' information contained on
the registration forms shall be kept confidential and may only be released to those authorized to receive
such information).
81. 18 U.S.C. § 5038(e) (2012) (specifying that the child's identity and image shall not be
publicly released except in limited circumstances); see also U.S. v. Three Juveniles, 61 F.3d 86, 88 (1st
Cir. 1995) ("The confidentiality provisions of the [Federal Juvenile Delinquency] Act are therefore quite
essential to the Act's statutory scheme and overarching rehabilitative purpose."); U.S. v. Under Seal,
709 F.3d 257, 261-62 (4th Cir. 2013) (reviewing SORNA provisions that run counter to the Federal
Juvenile Delinquency Act).
82. See, e.g., U.S. v. Brian N., 900 F.2d 218, 220 (10th Cir. 1990) (reiterating that the purpose of
the juvenile court proceeding is to "remove juveniles from the ordinary criminal process in order to
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There is an irony to the juxtaposition of a juvenile court proceeding
that is cloaked in the protection of confidentiality and contemporaneous
public notification of that child's crime. That irony was not lost on one
court:
We also find it ironic that . .. Ohio appellate courts protect the child's

privacy and use only the child's initials in the caption or the text. At the
same time, however .. . Ohio's AWA automatically requires Tier III
juvenile sexual offenders to register and to report to local authorities,
which removes all anonymity prior to the outcome of any rehabilitation
efforts.
B. A Clash ofPolicies
SORNA's requirement that children in the juvenile justice system
must nonetheless register as sex offenders is in obvious opposition to the
systems twin precepts: confidentiality and the potential for
rehabilitation. It, therefore, sets up a classic legal dilemma with which
even law students are familiar-how to reconcile competing statutory
aims. On one side is a firmly established codification of judicial
philosophy that treats juvenile offenders differently. On the other side is
Congress's intent to carve out an exception within the juvenile justice
system for children who commit sexual offenses. 84
How might the important policies contained in the FJDA and
Congress's desire to require child offenders to register be reconciled?
Simply put, they cannot be. Policies of rehabilitation and protection of
the child's privacy cannot coexist with the requirements of registration
and notification to the community of their delinquency.85 They cannot
coexist because the burdens associated with registration and community
notification detrimentally impact a child's chance for rehabilitation.8 6
The mandatory registration of J.L., who had consensual sexual
intercourse with his underage girlfriend, troubled one justice who wrote,
"The mandatory disposition of this case appears to have the opposite
avoid the stigma of a prior criminal conviction and to encourage treatment and rehabilitation"). But see
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 676(a) (West 2013) (permitting the public to attend juvenile court
proceedings where certain crimes are alleged to have been committed).
83. In re W.Z., 957 N.E.2d 367, 381 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011).
84. See supra notes 14-23 and accompanying text (delineating when children must register
because of the commission of certain offenses).
85. See, e.g., U.S. v. Juvenile Male, 590 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated, 131 S. Ct. 2860
(2011) (finding that protection of privacy and confidentiality are subomed by SORNA requirements that
juvenile offenders must register); see also In re C.P., 967 N.E.2d 729, 746 (Ohio 2012) (stating that
"[r]egistration and notification requirements frustrate two of the fundamental elements of juvenile
rehabilitation: confidentiality and the avoidance of stigma").
86. See, e.g., In re W.Z, 957 N.E.2d at 377 ("[Al child who commits a one-time mistake is
automatically, irrebuttably, and permanently presumed to be beyond redemption or rehabilitation.").
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effect [of encouraging rehabilitation]. Rather than promoting J.L.'s
rehabilitation, the State has ensured that J.L. will be labeled as a sex
offender for the rest of his life."8 7
To require a child to register sits in direct opposition to efforts to
rehabilitate the child. Consider the words of a child offender who was
placed on the registry at fourteen years old: "[O]ur mistake is forever
available to the world to see. There is no redemption, no forgiveness.
You are never done serving your time. There is never a chance for a
fresh start. You are finished. I wish I was executed because my life is
basically over."88
Generally, when statutes are in conflict, canons of statutory
construction dictate that the specific will trump the general.89 Faced
with whether to preserve the core of the juvenile justice system or to
accede to Congressional intent to make children register, courts have
taken the position that confidentiality and rehabilitation must give way
to Congress's view that child offenders pose such a danger to the
community. 90 On this point, the Family Court of Delaware wrote:
[I]n applying Megan's Laws to juveniles, many States, Delaware being
no exception, suddenly appeared to disregard a concept which the
American Criminal Justice System, indeed the criminal justice systems
adopted in almost every country around the world, had recognized for
over 100 years, that juveniles are different from adults and should be
treated differently. 9 1
No matter that Congress's position is contradicted by significant
statistical evidence and psychological analysis; 92 courts, nonetheless,
have deferred to Congressional intent without much resistance." United
States v. Under Seal offers an excellent example of this deference. 94 in
87. People ex rel. J.L., 800 N.W.2d 720,725 (S.D. 2011) (Meierhenry, Ret. J., concurring
specially).
88. See RAISED ON THE REGISTRY, supra note 10, at 52 (quoting then 16 year old Austin S. from
Louisiana); see also HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, US: MORE HARM THAN GOOD 52 (May 1, 2013),

available at http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/05/01/us-more-harm-good (statements of Dominic G., who
was required to register for an offense he committed when he was thirteen) ("I'm a ghost. I can't put
my name on a lease, I never receive mail. No one cares if I am alive. In fact, I think they would prefer
me dead.").
89. See, e.g., In re J.R.Z., 648 N.W.2d 241, 247 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) ("Generally, specific
statutory provisions control general provisions when the two are in conflict.").
90. See, e.g., U.S. v. Under Seal, 709 F.3d 257, 262 (4th Cir. 2013).
91. Fletcher v. State, No. 0404010688, 2008 WL 2912048, at *5 (Fam. Ct. Del. June 16, 2008).
92. See infra notes 246-251 (citing various recidivism studies).
93. See, e.g., In re JR., 341 Ill.App.3d 784, 804 (Il. Ct. App. 2003) (rejecting claim that
registration and notification violated procedural or substantive due process); State v. Eighth Jud. Dist.
Ct., 306 P.3d 369, 372 (Nev. 2013) (concluding that retroactive application of statute was constitutional
as applied to child offender); In re J.L.E., 223 P.3d 323 (Kan. Ct. App. 2010) (summarily finding
obligation of child offender to register).
94. See, e.g., Under Seal, 709 F.3d at 262.
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declaring the primacy of SORNA over conflicting provisions of the
FJDA, the court stated:
Our review is limited to interpreting the statutes, and both the statutory
text, legislative history and timing of SORNA indicate that its reporting
and registration requirements were plainly intended by Congress to reach
a limited class of juveniles adjudicated delinquent in cases of aggravated
sexual abuse, including Appellant, despite any contrary provisions of the
FJDA."
Acquiescence to legislative intent is not uncommon. In fact, great
deference is afforded to legislative intent to craft parameters of
offenses.9 6 However, as Justice Bell of the Maryland Court of Appeals
observed when considering the validity of Maryland's strict liability
statutory rape statute, legislative authority does not come with
impunity.
There must be occasions where the court observes
principles that extend beyond interpreting legislative intent.
C. Emotion that Clouds the Debate
Reliance on formalism to choose among competing statutory aims
disregards an underlying but unspoken motivation for the choice. In
truth, deference to SORNA's mandatory registration of children is not
solely an exercise in statutory construction. It is a choice fueled by
emotion.
To be sure, we are afraid of the sexual predator. Images from high
profile cases continue to haunt us even as statistics show child sexual
abuse declining. 98 Jerry Sandusky is that image. A trusted and
respected assistant coach of a major college football team and founder
of a youth charity, he preyed on young boys from disadvantaged homes,
showering them with attention and gifts. 99 Grooming, it is called.'00
95. Id.
96. See generally Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957) (emphasizing the
considerable weight that courts give to legislative authority); Liparota v. U.S., 471 U.S. 419, 424 (1985)
("The definition of the elements of a criminal offense is entrusted to the legislature .... .").
97. Garnett v. State, 632 A.2d 797, 817 (Md. 1993) (Bell, J., dissenting) ("To recognize that a
State legislature may, in defining criminal offenses, exclude mens rea, is not to suggest that it may do so
with absolute impunity, without any limitation whatsoever.").
98. See Erica Goode, Researchers See Decline in Child Sexual Abuse Rate, NEW YORK TIMES,
June 28, 2012, at A13 (reporting a 60% decline in child sexual abuse cases from 1992 to 2010).
99. See Maureen Dowd, American Horror Story, NEW YORK TIMES, June 12, 2012, at A27
(reporting on Sandusky's pattern of abuse directed at fatherless children).
100. See Malcolm Gladwell, In Plain View: How Child Molesters Get Away with It, THE NEW
YORKER,
Sept.
24,
2012,
http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/atlarge/2012/09/24/120924crat-atlargegladwell
(describing
grooming as "the process by which child molesters ingratiate themselves into the communities they wish
to exploit").

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol82/iss3/2

18

Carpenter: Against Juvenile Sex Offender Registration

2014]1

AGAINST JUVENILE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION

765

After a lengthy investigation, Sandusky was convicted of forty-five
counts of sexual molestation of ten young boys.' 0 '
Jerry Sandusky is not the only image we have of the serial sexual
predator. Philip Garrido, a registered sex offender, is another terrifying
image. He abducted Jaycee Lee Dugard in broad daylight on her way to
school when she was eleven years old, and he kept her captive for
eighteen years, raping her repeatedly.1 02 In similarly violent fashion,
Ariel Castro kidnapped three young women over a three year period,
brutalizing them for the next eleven years in his home in a Cleveland
suburb before their escape.' 03
This horror is real. These images frighten us and stay with us. So
powerful are the "pictures in our heads," political journalist Walter
Lippmann wrote that we rely on them to shape our view of the world.104
In the case of Ariel Castro, the boarded up and dilapidated home where
he repeatedly raped and assaulted the women was such a devastating
symbol of the horror these women faced that the house was demolished
shortly after Castro was sentenced to prison.' 0 5
Not only does the image of the serial predator haunt us, it spurs us to
act.106 The separate and tragic deaths of three young children-Adam
Walsh in 1981,107 Jacob Wetterling in 1992,10 and Megan Kanka in
101. See Joe Drape, Sandusky Guilty of Sexual Abuse of l0 Young Boys, NEW YORK TIMES, June
22, 2012, at Al (reporting on the conviction of former Penn State Assistant Football Coach Jerry
Sandusky).
102. See Casey Glynn, Nancy and Philip GarridoSentencedfor Jaycee Lee DugardKidnapping,
CBS NEWS (June 2, 2011, 1:56 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/nancy-and-philip-garridosentenced-for-jaycee-lee-dugard-kidnapping (following the conviction of Phillip and Nancy Garrido for
the kidnapping and rape of Jaycee Lee Dugard).
103. See Michael Muskal, Ariel Castro Sentenced; Victim Says His 'Hell Is Just Beginning', LA
TIMES (Aug. 1, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/aug/Ol/nation/la-na-ariel-castro-20130802
(reporting on the sentencing of Ariel Castro).
104. See LORI DORFMAN & VINCENT SCHIRALDI, OFF BALANCE: YOUTH, RACE & CRIME IN THE

NEWS
4
(2001),
available
http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/off balance.pdf
(quoting

at
WALTER

LIPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINION (1922)).

105. Jennifer Lindgren, Doug Stanglin & Yamiche Alcindor, Ariel Castro's House of Horror
Leveled in Cleveland, USA TODAY (Aug. 7, 2013, 3:56 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
nation/2013/08/07/ariel-castro-cleveland-house-abduction/2626855
(reporting on the community's
desire to demolish Castro's home).
106. See generally Carpenter,supranote 53.
107. See

Our

History,

NAT'L

CTR.

FOR

MISSING

&

EXPLOITED

CHILDREN,

http://www.missingkids.com/History (last visited May 7, 2014) (describing the heartbreaking story of
Adam Walsh's abduction and murder in 1981). In response to this tragedy, Adam's father, John Walsh,
established the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children. See About John Walsh, Host of
"America's Most
Wanted", NAT'L CTR. FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILDREN,
http://www.missingkids.com/enUS/documents/PressKitJohnWalsh.pdf#page=l (last visited May 7,
2014).
108. See How We Began and the Need for Transition, JACOB WETTERLING RESOURCE CTR.,
http://www.gundersenhealth.org/ncptc/jacob-wetterling-resource-center/who-we-are/history (last visited
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1994109-served as the catalyst for national legislation on sex offender
registration laws110 and public notification statutes."' In the state of
New Jersey, where Megan Kanka was murdered, the response from the
legislature was swift. It passed the first community notification lawwhat we have come to call "Megan's Law"-three months after a public
petition supported it.112
In fact, it is the singular death of seven year old Megan who was
brutally raped and murdered by her neighbor Jesse Timmendequas"l 3
that frightens us the most. The push for community notification laws
was an attempt to gain control over the frightening realization that
someone previously convicted of the sexual assault of other children
could live in a neighborhood without the knowledge of parents in the
community.114
Professor Walker Wilson observes that "our desire to exercise control
over potential threats is a driving force behind much of human
behavior.""' 5 This need to exercise control over terrifying images of
violent sexual predators has led us to ramp up sex offender registration
and notification schemes over the past decade with a "dizzying array of
increased registration and community notification requirements, the
emergence of harshening residency restrictions, and the elimination of
individuated risk assessment."" 6 As Professor Wayne Logan wrote,
"To students of the field, the laws-often enacted unanimously and
without meaningful debate-serve as object lessons in legislative
panic."ll7

May 7, 2014) (explaining how the movement began to create national sex offender registration):
109. See State v. Timmendequas, 737 A.2d 55, 66-73 (N.J. 1999) (detailing the brutal assault and
murder of seven-year-old Megan Kanka in 1994 by Jesse Timmendequas, a neighbor who, unbeknownst
to Megan's family, had prior convictions for sexual assault against children).
110. The Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offenders Registration
Program, Pub. L. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2038 (1994).
111. Pub. L. No. 104-145, § 2, 110 Stat. 1345 (1996) (amending the Jacob Wetterling Act to
include the requirement that state law enforcement agencies "shall release relevant information that is
necessary to protect the public concerning a specific person required to register under this section").
112. See E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1081-82 (3d Cir. 1997).
113. See Timmendequas, 737 A.2d at 67-68.
114. See Lisa Anderson, Demand Grows to ID Molesters, States Weigh Children'sSafety Versus
Offenders' Rights, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 15, 1994, availableat http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1994-0815/news/9408150089_1_kanka-family-megan-kanka-offenders (identifying community anger as "the
catalyst" for passage of community notification laws); Stephen W. Dill, A Pleafor the Sake of Megan,
PHILA. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 3, 1994, at 4 (reporting on community rallies that urged passage of new laws
to protect the public).
115. Walker Wilson, supranote 54, at 511.
116. See Carpenter & Beverlin, supra note 57, at 108. See also Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371,
374-77 (Ind. 2009) (critiquing the many changes of Indiana's sex offender registration laws).
117. Wayne A. Logan, Megan's Law as a Case Study in PoliticalStasis, 61 SYRACUSE L. REV.
371, 371 (2011).
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James Starkey can attest to the increasingly harsh penalties he faced
in the ten years since he was required to register as a sex offender."'
Goal posts kept moving on James, a signal of the escalating social panic
surrounding sex offender registration laws. Initially in 1998, Starkey
received a deferred adjudication in Texas to the charge of sexual assault
of a fifteen year old." 9 He was required to register for ten years, a term
that was subsequently upheld when he moved to Oklahoma a short time
later.120 That requirement was set to expire in 2008, but because of a
serially-amended sex offender registration law, Starkey's crime was
recast by the Oklahoma legislature to require lifetime registration just as
his obligation was set to end.121
The fear-sometimes real, but sometimes imaginedl 2 2 -has spilled
over into our handling of children convicted of sex crimes. 123 Our desire
to protect our children from Jerry Sandusky, Philip Garrido, and Jesse
Timmendequas has moved us to broaden the reach of sex offender laws
to include children in the juvenile justice system. But it has come at the
expense of forsaking foundational policies of rehabilitation and
confidentiality. Historian Philip Jenkins described the phenomenon as a
"social panic" in which the "fear is wildly exaggerated and wrongly
directed."l 24 Jenkins wrote:
When the official reaction to a person, groups of persons or series of
events is out of all proportion to the actual threat offered, when experts,
in the form of police chiefs, the judiciary, politicians and editors perceive
118. See Starkey v. Okla. Dep't of Corrs., 305 P.3d 1004 (Okla. 2013) (reviewing the harshening
of Starkey's registration requirements).
119. It is unclear from the record whether the adjudication was for sexual actions that were
consented to or compelled. Id. at 1008.
120. Id. at 1009. But see id. (examining whether Starkey was required to register at all in
Oklahoma).
121. Id.
122. See Richard G. Wright, Sex Offender Post-IncarcerationSanctions: Are There Any Limits?,
34 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 17, 21-25 (2008) (providing statistics that sexual
assault by a stranger is an "infrequently occurring event"). See also DORFMAN & VINCENT, supra note
104, at 3 ("Although violent crime by youth in 1998 was at its lowest point in the 25-year history of the
National Crime Victimization Survey, 62% of poll respondents felt that juvenile crime was on the
increase.").
123. See, e.g., Elizabeth Garfinkle, Coming of Age in America: The Misapplication of SexOffender Registration and Community-Notification Laws to Juveniles, 91 CAL. L. REv. 163 (2003)
(arguing that community notification statutes are ineffective when applied to child offenders); Brittany
Enniss, Note, Quickly Assuaging Public Fear: How the Well-Intended Adam Walsh Act Led to
Unintended Consequences, 2008 UTAH L. REv. 697, 706-08 (2008) (noting that the AWA, enacted to
protect minors, has harmed juvenile offenders who have been subject to its provisions).
124. See PHILIP JENKINS, MORAL PANIC: CHANGING CONCEPTS OF THE CHILD MOLESTER IN

MODERN AMERICA 6-7 (1998) (criticizing the public's fear of sexual offenses as highly disproportionate
to the threat of the offenses themselves); see also John Douard, Sex Offender as Scapegoat: The
Monstrous Other Within, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 31, 41 (2009) ("[S]ex offenders are the targets of
'moral panic."').

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

21

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 2

768

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 82

the threat in all but identical terms, and appear to talk with one voice of
rates, diagnoses, prognoses and solutions, when the media representations
universally stress sudden and dramatic increases . . . then we believe it is

appropriate to speak of a moralpanic.125
Sweeping generalizations and hastily passed legislation are hallmarks
of the social panic that surrounds sex offender registration laws. The
emotion that grips us leads to registration laws drafted so broadly that
they ensnare equally the rapist and the child who engages in consensual
sexual intercourse.' 26 Panic causes us to pass registration laws quickly
and without much scrutiny. 127 While it is certainly true that a few child

offenders demonstrate predatory behavior,128 panic also leads us to
ignore evidence that child sex offenders are not likely to reoffendl2 9 or
that they commit sexual crimes for a myriad of reasons other than
predatory inclinations.130
Reliance on legislative deference may be the explicitly stated reason
for support of Congressional intent to carve out an exception for child
sex offenders in the juvenile justice system. But, by no means is it the
only reason.
III. ACKNOWLEDGING THE STIGMA OF CHILD REGISTRATION

All sex offender registration is stigmatizing.

Of that there is

125. Philip Jenkins, Failure to Launch: Why Do Some Social Issues Fail to Detonate Moral
Panics?,49 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 35, 35 (2009) (quoting STUART HALL ET AL., POLICING THE CRISIS:
MUGGING, THE STATE, AND LAW AND ORDER 16 (1978)).

126. See infra Part IV (discussing the excessive nature of sex offender registration laws). See also
Eric J. Bruske, Note, Sex Offenders are Different: Extending Graham to CategoricallyProtect the Less
Culpable, 89 WASH. U. L. REV 417, 418 (2011) (contrasting the cases of an eighteen year old who
posted a nude picture of his ex-girlfriend with a serial predatory pedophile, both of whom were required
to register as sex offenders).
127. See, e.g., Logan, supra note 117, at 374 (describing how "the Speaker of the Assembly
Garabed 'Chuck' Haytaian, running for the U.S. Senate, declared a legislative emergency, bypassing
customary committee debate and forcing sex offender registration and community notification proposals
to move directly to the floor for consideration").
128. See, e.g., B.W. v. State, 909 N.E.2d 471, 474 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (describing child offender
as "very high risk" to reoffend based on a history of predatory sexual contact with at least 47 people,
ranging in age from two to "seniors").
129. See, e.g., NICOLE PrITMAN & QUYEN NGUYEN, A SNAPSHOT OF JUVENILE SEX OFFENDER
REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION LAWS: A SURVEY OF THE UNITED STATES 6 (2012), available at

http://www.ovsom.texas.gov/docs/JuvenileSex-Offender-Registration-and-Notification-Laws-Snapshot2012.pdf (citing studies compiled by Professor Franklin E. Zimring revealing that over 92% of all individuals
who committed a sex offense as a juvenile did not commit another sex offense); see also id. (noting that Dr.
Elizabeth Letoumeau conducted a study finding a sexual offense reconviction rate of less than 1%); Leon,
supra note 22, at 145 (analyzing data collected by the author to conclude that sex offenders had a 5.3% rate of
recidivism over a three year follow-up period); Janis F. Bremer, Juveniles Who Engage in Serually Harming
Behavior-A RestorativeJsticeSystem, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1085, 1087 (2006) (reporting a recidivism
rate of 4% among a sample conducted in 1996 of 1600 child sex offenders).
130. See infra Part V.
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agreement, even among courts that have held that registration schemes
are only civil regulations.' 3 1 Indeed, courts recognize that being
publicly labeled a "sex offender" is sufficiently derogatory to severely
injure a person's reputation. 132 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
summed it up well when it wrote that it could "hardly conceive of a
state's action bearing more 'stigmatizing consequences' than the
labeling of [an individual] as a sex offender."l 33 Even the term 'stigma,'
which has been generally defined as a "mark or token of infamy,
disgrace, or reproach," 34 underscores this observation.
Therefore, the question is not whether registration is stigmatizing.
The question is whether the stigma associated with registration rises to
the level of punishment. Certainly, the seminal 2003 Supreme Court
opinion in Smith v. Doe provides the framework for this inquiry.' 3 5 The
Court found that Alaska's sex offender registration scheme was not
sufficiently stigmatizing to be punitive for purposes of an ex post facto
analysis under the Eighth Amendment.' 36
From the registrants' perspective in Smith, stigma flowed directly
from the shame and humiliation accompanying registration and
notification. As such, their argument continued, registration and
notification were tantamount to the shaming punishments employed in
Colonial times.' 37
However, the Court rejected that contention, writing, "[T]he stigma of
Alaska's Megan's Law results not from public display for ridicule and
shaming but from the dissemination of accurate information about a

131. See, e.g., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 99 (2003) ("It must be acknowledged that notice of a
criminal conviction subjects the offender to public shame, the humiliation increasing in proportion to the
extent of the publicity. And the geographic reach of the Internet is greater than anything which could
have been designed in colonial times."); see also Young v. State, 806 A.2d 233, 249 (Md. 2002) ("Being
labeled as a sexual offender within the community can be highly stigmatizing and can carry the potential
for social ostracism."); Ray v. State, 982 P.2d 931, 936 (Idaho 1999) ("[R]egistration brings notoriety to
a person convicted of a sexual offense [and] does prolong the stigma attached to such convictions.").
132. See State v. Norman, 808 N.W.2d 48, 61 (Neb. 2012) (acknowledging the stigma of
registration); Doe v. Pryor, 61 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1231 (M.D. Ala. 1999) ("While it might seem that a
convicted felon could have little left of his good name, community notification ... will inflict a greater
stigma than would result from conviction alone."); State v. Robinson, 873 So. 2d 1205, 1212 (Fla. 2004)
("Robinson's designation as a 'sexual predator' certainly constitutes a stigma. No one can deny that
such a designation affects one's good name and reputation.").
133. Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 829 (9th Cir. 1997).
134. Doe v. Dep't of Pub. Safety ex rel. Lee, 271 F.3d 38, 47 (2d Cir. 2001), rev'd on other
grounds Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003) (quoting THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1702 (4th ed. 2000)).

135. Smith, 538 U.S. at 105-06 (2003) ("The Act is nonpunitive, and its retroactive application
does not violate the Ex PostFacto Clause.").
136. Id. at 97-100 (citing factors outlined in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 16869 (1963), to determine whether legislation is a civil regulation or criminal penalty).
137. Id at 97-98.
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criminal record, most of which is already public."'
The Court's
conclusion that notification is not the equivalent of a shaming
punishment was premised on the public nature of an adult trial and the
record it produces following a conviction. In fact, it was central to the
Court's reasoning. In favoring the constitutionality of notification, the
Court wrote, "Our system does not treat the dissemination of truthful
information in furtherance of a legitimate government objective as
punishment. On the contrary, our criminal law tradition insists on
39
public indictment,public trial, and public imposition of sentence."'
But herein lies the problem of applying the Smith rationale to child
registration. Unlike adult proceedings, delinquency adjudications are
not public. They are purposefully private to prevent stigma that may
attach to the child offender into adult years. 14 Stigma flows directly
from the notification and not from the delinquency adjudication, which
would remain confidential but for the notification requirement. That the
public nature of adult criminal proceedings so shaped the Court's
reasoning suggests, at a minimum, reconsideration of Smith's
applicability to child sex offender registration.
Further, not all stigma is created equal. No matter the impact on adult
offenders, Smith did not contemplate the profound shame inflicted on
child registrants. One need only consider the practical implications of
registration and notification burdens on children to appreciate the truth
of it. Registration and notification cast a long and punitive shadow over
the registrants' lives as registrants face ever-changing and harshening
burdens. 14 1 As the court in In re C.P. observed, "Registration and
notification requirements for life, with the possibility of having them
lifted only after 25 years, are especially harsh punishments for a
juvenile."l 4 2 This echoes the reasoning of the Supreme Court in
Grahamv. Florida,where the Court surmised that "[1]ife without parole
is an especially harsh punishment on a juvenile [offender] . . . . [A]
138. Id. at 98.
139. Id. at 99 (emphasis added). See also A.C.L.U. of Nev. v. Masto, 670 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir.
2012) (relying on Smith to find that "[a]ctive dissemination of an individual's sex offender status does
not alter the [Smith] Court's core reasoning that stigma [comes from] the dissemination of accurate
information about a criminal record").
140. See In re C.P., 967 N.E.2d 729, 746 (Ohio 2012) ("Registration and notification
requirements frustrate two of the fundamental elements of juvenile rehabilitation: confidentiality and the
avoidance of stigma.").
141. See Carpenter & Beverlin, supra note 57, at 1073 (labeling the serially-amended registration
schemes "super-registration schemes").
142. In re C.P., 967 N.E.2d at 741. In response to the position that registration impermissibly
burdens the child offender, some states have amended their statutes to reflect that position. See, e.g.,
Fletcher v. State, No. 0404010688, 2008 WL 2912048, at *10 (Del. Fam. Ct. Jun. 16, 2008) (explaining
the newly enacted procedure of "deregistration" designed to ameliorate the burdensome nature of
registration).
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juvenile will serve more years and a greater percentage of his life in
prison than an adult offender."1 43 As well for the juvenile offender who,
post-imprisonment, must register as a sex offender. Registration and
notification burdens are felt for a longer period of time and in ways
more onerous for juveniles than their adult counterparts.
Child sex offender registration triggers residential dislocation,144
educational depravation,145 impactful residency restrictions,146 and
stigmatization and community isolation.147 In a compelling essay, Dr.
Janis Bremer argues that punitive responses directed at children in the
form of isolation and stigmatization "create a negative feedback loop
where young people are placed in a one-down dependent position with
no hope of regaining a position of equality in society." 48
The feelings expressed by Christian W. encapsulate the devastating
experience of child sex offender registration. Christian was fourteen
years old when he went on the registry for inappropriately touching his
younger cousin. At age twenty-six, Christian said, "I live in a general
sense of hopelessness, and combat suicidal thoughts almost daily due to
the life sentence [registration] and punishment of being a registrant. The
stigma and shame will never fully go away, people will always
remember."l 49
Christian W. is not alone in combating thoughts of suicide. For Evan
B., those thoughts turned into a reality. 50 He was placed on the state
offender registry after exposing himself in a high school bathroom to
143. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011,2028 (2010).
144. See RAISED ON THE REGISTRY, supra note 10, at 1-2 (recounting that Jacob C. was required
to live in a group home because he was not allowed to live with his family); In re J.W., 787 N.E.2d 747,
765 (Ill. 2003) (involving juvenile's banishment from his neighborhood as a condition of probation).
And although not a child registrant, nineteen year old Frank Rodriguez was forced to move from his
family home and his twelve year old sister because he was on the Texas registry for having sex with his
fifteen year old girlfriend. See John Stossel, Gena Binkley & Andrew G. Sullivan, The Age ofConsent:
When Young Love Is a Sex Crime, ABC NEWS, Mar. 7, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/
2020/Stossel/Storyid=4400537.
145. See DuBuc, supra note 1 (last visited Jan. 28, 2014) (describing the loss of educational
opportunities that Leah DuBuc suffered because she was retroactively placed on the registry).
146. See infra Part IV (examining the increasingly harsh residency restrictions and their impact on
child offenders).
147. For an excellent discussion, see RAISED ON THE REGISTRY, supra note 10 (reviewing many
stories of child offenders whose lives have been severely impacted by registration and notification).
148. Bremer, supra note 129, at 1089.
149. See RAISED ON THE REGISTRY, supra note 10, at 51 (relaying a telephone interview with
Christian W.).
150. See No EASY ANSWERS, supra note 5 (detailing the account of the young man's suicide
without releasing his name). Evan B.'s story was recounted elsewhere with his name included. See,
e.g., Lara Geer Farley, The Adam Walsh Act: The Scarlet Letter of the Twenty-First Century, 47
WASHBURN L. REv. 471 (2008); see also State Sex Offender Registration, THE CRIMINAL DEFENSE
LAWYER, http://www.criminaldefenselawyer.com/resources/state-sex-offender-registration.htm
(last
visited June 13, 2014).
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several female students. One year later, Evan B. shot and killed
himself.'t
Sometimes, it is important to articulate the obvious. That is the value
of the court's observation in In re C.P. when it wrote, "For a juvenile
offender, the stigma of the label of sex offender attaches at the start of
his adult life and cannot be shaken. . . . It will be a constant cloud, a

once-every-three month reminder to himself and the world that he
cannot escape the mistakes of his youth."1 52
IV. REGISTRATION AS PUNISHMENT: A CRIMINAL PENALTY DISGUISED AS
A CIVIL REGULATION

No matter the stigmatizing nature of sex offender registration, courts
have deemed it insufficient to prove that registration laws are criminal
penalties subject to Eighth Amendment constitutional scrutiny.'5 3 After
all, registration and notification burdens are not traditional forms of
punishments in that they do not deprive the offender of liberty in the
way of "shackles, chains, or barred cells."' 5 4
Labeling whether a law is civil or criminal is often an exercise in line
drawing. Just how punitive is the regulation?' 5 5 On this point, two
decades of jurisprudence, capped by Smith v. Doe, have produced a
fairly consistent message regarding sex offender registration laws: the
are not sufficiently punitive to trigger Eighth Amendment analysis.
Since Smith, the jurisprudence affirming registration schemes as civil
regulations has only grown,' 5 7 with courts concluding that Smith
151. See No EASY ANSWERS, supranote 5 (attributing Evan B.'s suicide to the burdens associated
with his requirement to register as a sex offender).

152. In re C.P., 967 N.E.2d 729, 741-42 (Ohio 2012).
153. See infra note 156.
154. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993) (rejecting substantive due process violation
because no traditional liberty interest was implicated); Cf Helman v. State, 784 A.2d 1058, 1064 (Del.
2001) (concluding that the "assignment of a convicted sex offender to a statutorily-mandated Risk
Assessment Tier does not implicate a protected liberty interest under the State or Federal Constitution").
155. See Austin v. U.S., 509 U.S. 602, 610 (1993) ("Thus, the question is not, as the United States
would have it, whether forfeiture . .. is civil or criminal, but rather whether it is punishment.").
156. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105-06 (2003) ("The Act is nonpunitive, and its retroactive
application does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause."). Lower courts had similarly concluded. See,
e.g., Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 372 (N.J. 1995) (concluding that registration and notification laws
were designed to protect the public and not to punish the offender); accord State v. Myers 923 P.2d
1024 (Kan. 1996); State v. Young, 544 N.w.2d 808 (Neb. 1996); In re Meyer, 16 P.3d. 563 (Wash.
2001) (en banc). But see Doe v. Att'y Gen., 686 N.E.2d 1007 (Mass. 1997) (concluding that registration
and notification requirements were unconstitutional as applied to the lowest level of offender).
Following Smith, federal courts have followed suit. See U.S. v. Young, 585 F.3d 199, 204 n.26 (5th Cir.
2009) (citing to decisions in the 4th, 6th, 8th, 9th, 10th, and Ilth circuits that concluded sex offender
registration schemes are not punitive).
157. See, e.g., U.S. v. May, 535 F.3d 912, 920 (8th Cir. 2008), abrogatedby Reynolds v. U.S.,
132 S. Ct. 795 (2012) (finding that SORNA's registration requirements "demonstrate no congressional
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controls the analysis.158 The Seventh Circuit's reasoning is illustrative.
Referencing Smith, the court wrote, "[W]hether a comprehensive
registration regime targeting only sex offenders is penal ... is not an

open question."

59

Guiding Smith is the two-part "intent-effects" test from Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez.160 First is the intent: whether the legislature
intended the statute to be a civil remedy or criminal penalty. 16 1 Second,
is the effect of the legislation: whether despite the regulatory aim of the

law, it nonetheless is "so punitive either in purpose or effect ... as to
transform what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal
penalty."' 62
Applying the first prong of Mendoza-Martinez has been relatively
easy. Courts have found evidence of regulatory intent underlying sex
offender registration laws in the legislative history where the civil intent
intent to punish sex offenders"); see also U.S. v. W.B.H., 664 F.3d 848 (1lth Cir. 2011) (holding that
registration is civil in nature); A.C.L.U. of Nev. v. Masto, 670 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2012) (concluding
that registration did not violate ex post facto principles); Commonwealth v. Baker, 295 S.W.3d 437, 443
(Ky. 2009) (stating that the registration scheme was civil in nature). For similar cases involving juvenile
sex offenders, see U.S. v. Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2012); In re Alva, 92 P.3d 311, 313
(Cal. 2004).
158. See, e.g., In re W.M., 851 A.2d 431, 435 (D.C. 2004) ("In line with the reasoning in [Smith],
we hold that the District's SORA is not punitive."); see also U.S. v. Parks, 698 F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir.
2012) (relying extensively on the analysis ofSmith to find that Maine's sex offender registration scheme
was not punitive); accord Doe v. Bredesen, 507 F.3d 998, 1003-07 (6th Cir. 2007); Lee v. State, 895
So.2d 1038, 1041-43 (Ct. Crim. App. Ala. 2004). But see Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 379-84
(Ind. 2009) (applying the Mendoza-Martinez factors to hold that Indiana's sex offender registration
scheme was punitive); accord State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 16-26 (Me. 2009); State v. Williams, 952
N.E.2d 1108, 1113 (Ohio 2011); Starkey v. Okla. Dep't of Corrs., 305 P.3d 1004 (Okla. 2013).
159. U.S. v. Leach, 639 F.3d 769, 773 (7th Cir. 2011). Although a few Supreme Court decisions
have addressed particular aspects of the constitutionality of sex offender registration schemes, Smith
remains the only Court opinion to address whether sex offender registration schemes are punitive under
the Eighth Amendment. See Conn. Dep't Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 3-4 (2003) (holding that
procedural due process did not demand hearing to determine offender's future dangerousness where all
offenders were listed on state registry for public notification); Carr v. U.S., 560 U.S. 438 (2010)
(determining that burdens attached to failure to register were intended to apply to prospective travelers
only); Reynolds v. U.S., 132 S. Ct. 975, 981-84 (2012) (defining the authority ofthe Attorney General
to implement SORNA); U.S. v. Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. 2496, 2504-05 (2013) (finding that one
convicted by a special court-martial of a sexual offense was already subjected to pre-SORNA
registration requirements).
160. 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963) (articulating seven factors to be used to determine whether a
regulation's effect is punitive). For a sample of cases that have analyzed sex offender registration
schemes under Mendoza-Martinez, see Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371 (Ind. 2009) (analyzing the
Mendoza-Martinez factors to hold that Indiana's amended sex offender registration laws were punitive);
U.S. v. Under Seal, 709 F.3d 257 (4th Cir. 2013); Femedeer v. Haun, 227 F.3d 1244, 1248 (10th Cir.
2000) (utilizing the intent-effects test).
161. See U.S. v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 277 (1996) (describing the first stage of inquiry as whether
Congress intended the forfeiture law to be a "remedial civil sanction").
162. Hudson v. U.S., 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997); see also U.S. v. Juvenile Male, 590 F.3d 924, 94041 (9th Cir. 2009) (applying Hudson to find that the public dissemination of a juvenile sex offender's
information is punitive in effect because of the high degree of confidentiality afforded juveniles).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

27

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 2

774

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 82

is articulated,163 in the placement of the registration scheme outside the
criminal code,164 or in language in the statute's preamble demonstrating
such intent.' 65
Yet, legislative intent alone is only the first step of analysis to
determine that the law is a civil regulation and not a criminal penalty.
The second step requires analysis of the effects of the law. Under this
analysis, a regulation may be deemed to impose a criminal penalty
where the legislation is excessive in relation to its nonpunitive purpose,
or where it no longer bears a rational relation to its regulatory aim.' 66
Mendoza-Martinez identified seven factors to help guide the
determination:
[1] Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
[2] whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment[,] [3]
whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, [4] whether its
operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution
and deterrence, [5] whether the behavior to which it applies is already a
crime, [6] whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be
connected is assignable for it, and [7] whether it appears excessive in
relation to the alternative purpose assigned.167
Analysis of these factors exposes the constitutional vulnerability of
sex offender registration laws as applied to children. While the intent of
the scheme is purportedly civil in nature, the effect is not.
163. See, e.g., U.S. v. Under Seal, 709 F.3d 257 (4th Cir. 2013) (relying on legislative history to
conclude that SORNA was nonpunitive); Commonwealth v. Baker, 295 S.W.3d 437, 443 (Ky. 2009)
(finding that the legislature intended its registration scheme to be civil in nature). Even where courts
have found their state's sex offender registration laws to be punitive, they have nonetheless found that
the legislature had a regulatory purpose for enacting the laws. See State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 16
(Me. 2009) (acknowledging that the legislature intended registration to be a civil regulation because the
laws were "entirely outside of the Criminal Code"); State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108, 1110-11 (Ohio
2011) (recognizing that the legislature intended the sex offender registration scheme to be remedial).
164. See, e.g., Under Seal, 709 F.3d at 264 (4th Cir. 2013) (justifying SORNA's civil purpose by
the code's placement in the public health and welfare section of the code).
165. It is not uncommon for legislative preambles to articulate the civil purpose of the registration
scheme. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-8302 (2011) ("The legislature further finds that providing
public access to certain information about convicted sexual offenders assists parents in the protection of
their children."); ME. REv. STAT. tit. 34-A, § 11201 (1996) invalidatedby State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d. 4
(2009) ("The purpose of this chapter is to protect the public from potentially dangerous registrants and
offenders by enhancing access to information concerning those registrants and offenders."); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 28.721a (2011) ("The legislature has determined that a person who has been convicted
of committing an offense covered by this act poses a potential serious menace and danger to the health,
safety, morals, and welfare of the people, and particularly the children, of this state.").
166. See Hudson v. U.S., 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997). Generally, courts have found that the
requirement to register bears a rational relationship to its regulatory aim. See, e.g., In re J.W., 204 1ll.2d
50 (Ill. 2003) (affirming lifetime registration for a twelve year old adjudicated delinquent reasoning that
"there is a rational relationship between the registration of juvenile sex offenders and the protection of
the public from such offenders").
167. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1962).
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A. An Affirmative DisabilityAkin to Punishment

Although registration does not share all the attributes of
imprisonment, modem registration burdens are, in fact, affirmative
disabilities designed to restrict the registrant's liberty. No longer can
one claim that registration burdens are benign as was the conclusion
reached in Smith with respect to Alaska's sex offender registration
scheme from the 1990s. The Smith court found that registration under
the Alaskan model did not appear to restrict movement because inperson registration was infrequent and only applied to a small class of
registrants.' 68 Additionally, registrants were "free to move where they
wish and to live and work as other citizens, with no supervision."l'69
Modem registration schemes, however, are different. Modem
registration schemes require frequent in-person registration by many
classes of registrants.170 So burdensome can be the frequency of inperson registration that the Maine Supreme Court stated:
It belies common sense to suggest that a newly imposed lifetime
obligation to report to the police station every ninety days to verify one's
identification, residence, and school, and to submit to fingerprinting and
provide a current photograph, is not a substantial disability or restraint on
the free exercise of individual liberty. 17 1
For the child offender, the disability is exacerbated. SORNA's
classification of crimes results in automatic frequent in-person
registration of all child offenders because of the way SORNA
categorizes offenses committed by the child offenders. 172 Frequent inperson registration is not just a possibility; it is the norm. In addition,
the duration of registration is far more significant for a child offender
than for an adult offender. Since SORNA demands lifetime registration
for many juvenile offenders, the number of years a child will suffer inperson registration every three months is a more intrusive burden on a
child offender than on an adult offender.173
168. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 99 (2003) ("The Act's obligations are less harsh than the
sanctions of occupational debarment, which we have held to be nonpunitive.").
169. Id. at 101. But see id. at 110 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The [sex offender registration]
statutes impose significant affirmative obligations and a severe stigma on every person to whom they
apply.").
170. See, e.g., Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1009 (Alaska 2008) (describing Alaska's in-person
registration requirements); Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 379 (Ind. 2009) (detailing Indiana's inhome personal visitation to verify an offender's address); State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 24-25 (Me.
2009) (referencing Maine's requirement to register in-person every ninety days).
171. Letalien, 985 A.2d at 24-25.
172. See 42 U.S.C. § 16911(8) (2012) (defining the term "convicted" to include "adjudicated
delinquent as a juvenile for that offense, but only if the offender is 14 years of age or older at the time of
the offense. . . ").
173. For an interesting analysis of the duration of such burdens, see In re C.P., 967 N.E.2d 729,
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Modem residency restrictions also contribute significantly to the
affirmative disability and restraint on registrants. Current residency
restrictions aggressively and essentially close off major portions of a
particular state to sex offender registrants, 174 countering Smith's
observation that registration does not preclude registrants from changing
residences. 75

When first introduced, buffer zones were 1,000 feet or

less and were limited to traditional locations where children might
congregate.1 76 Today, buffer zones are often 2,000 feet or more,' 7 7 and
statutes have expanded the concept of "where children congregate" to
include bus stops,' 7 8 video arcades,17 9 and libraries. 80 One offender
recounted the difficulties in honoring the buffer zones:
Because I can't come in contact with anyone under the age of eighteen, I
find myself going to the store on a regular basis at night to make sure

there are no minors there. It makes me nervous just because if they wave
at you or make some look at you, you know you could potentially get in
trouble for that.' 8'
742 (Ohio 2012) (calculating on average the number of years that a child offender must suffer
registration burdens).
174. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-15 (2010) (preventing sex offenders from living within
1,000 feet of a school, day care center, or area where minors congregate); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 511 9.3(b) (2009) (barring sex offenders from loitering within 500 feet of a playground, child care centers,
or facilities that offer programs for children); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17.545 (West 2007) (barring sex
offenders from residing within 1000 feet of any preschool, primary or secondary school public
playground or licensed child day care facility); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-27-21.7 (2011) (prohibiting sex
offenders from being in the area, on foot or in or on any motorized or nonmotorized vehicle, of any day
care facility, public park, or primary or secondary school).
175. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 100 (2003) ("The Act does not restrain activities sex offenders
may pursue but leaves them free to change jobs or residences.").
176. See, e.g., 11 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1112 (2013) (preventing sex offenders from living
within 500 feet of school property); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(3)(b) (2009) (prohibiting sex
offenders from living within 1,000 feet of a school, day care center, or area where minors congregate);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.733(f) (2009) (defining student safety zones as "1,000 feet or less from school
property").
177. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 3003.5 (2013) (enlarging buffer zone because of the
enactment of Jessica's Law); see also ALA. CODE § 15-20-26(a) (2013) (expanding buffer zone from
1,000 feet to 2,000 feet); accordOKLA. STAT. tit. 57, § 590(A) (2013).
178. GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-12(a)(3) (2009) (including bus stops); accord H.R. 4323, Gen.
Assembly, I16th Sess. (S.C. 2006) (prohibiting certain sex offenders from residing within 1,000 feet of
bus stops).
179. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.1(2) (2004) (including free-standing video arcades in the
locations registered offenders may not visit).
180. H.R. 7621, 2006 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2006) (prohibiting sex offenders from residing
within 500 feet of libraries).
181. True Life: I'm a Sex Offender (MTV television broadcast Jan. 19, 2012), available at
http://www.mtv.com/videos/true-life-im-a-sex-offender/1677462/playlist.jhtml; see also Lee Higgins,
Young Pittsfield Township Man Struggles with Sex Offender Label, ANN ARBOR.COM NEWS (Dec. 15,
2009, 7:05 AM), http://www.annarbor.com/news/a-young-man-struggles-with-the-sex-offender-label
(describing a young man on the registry for voluntary sexual intercourse with underage girlfriend who
was charged with violating the residency restriction for living illegally within 1,000 feet of a school).
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As a result of expanding residency restrictions, numerous registrants
have very limited residency options available to them.182 Competition
among legislators to remove sex offenders from their community has led
to a "race to the harshest" in the form of aggressive residency
restrictions. 183 Indeed, so little real estate was left in San Diego County
following the enactment of Jessica's Law, that experts estimated only
2.3% of residential parcels complied with residency restrictions and
were affordable.' 84 One recent example is Southern California's
calculated placement of pocket parks that create artificial buffer zones
intended to remove sex offenders from their homes.18 5
B. Excessive Legislation in Relation to Civil Intent

In addition to suggesting that modern registration schemes are
affirmative disabilities, this Subpart questions whether sex offender
registration schemes still bear a rational relationship to their original
civil intent. The sheer weight and scope of current sex offender
registration schemes cast doubt on whether this is possible. Modem
registration schemes are drafted to cast a net so wide they ensnare those
who pose no future danger to the community. 186
But see Lee Higgins, Prosecutor Expected to Dismiss Case Against Matthew Freeman, ANN
ARBOR.COM NEWS (Mar. 2, 2010, 7:50 PM), http://www.annarbor.com/news/prosecutors-expected-todismiss-case-against-matthew-freeman.
182. See, e.g., In re Taylor, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 64, 67-71 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012), review grantedand
opinion superseded by 290 P.3d 1171 (Cal. 2013) (recounting the extreme difficulties for the four lead
plaintiffs to secure housing under newly-enacted California buffer zones). For articles on the plight of
registrants to find housing, see Damien Cave, Roadside Camp for Miami Sex Offenders Leads to
Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2009, at A14 (reporting that numerous sex offenders are forced to camp
out under Miami's Julia Tuttle Causeway without electricity or water because of an unusually expansive
residency restriction that bars registrants from living within 2,500 feet of where children gather);
Catharine Skipp & Arian Campo-Flores, A Bridge Too Far,NEWSWEEK, Aug. 3, 2009, at 49 (collecting
stories of displaced residents around the country, which included a group of homeless offenders in New
York who "were crammed into a trailer that periodically moved around until finally settling on the
grounds of the county jail"); Bill Ainsworth, Law Creates Homeless Parolees, Report Says: Sex
Offenders Limited by Residency Rules, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRI, Feb. 22, 2008, at Al (chronicling the
numerous registrants made homeless by the enactment of Jessica's Law in 2006).
183. See Carpenter, supra note 53, at 41. For a prophetic admonishment, see Corey Rayburn
Yung, Banishment by a ThousandLaws: Residency Restrictions on Sex Offenders, 85 WASH. U. L. REV.
101, 149 (2007) (foreshadowing that "the amount of real estate available to sex offenders will continue
to decrease and more sex offender communities will emerge").
184. Taylor, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 71-72 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012).
185. See Angel Jennings, L.A. Sees Parks as a Weapon Against Sex Offenders, LA TIMES (Feb.
28, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/feb/28/local/la-me-parks-sex-offenders-20130301 (reporting
on the construction of pocket parks designed with the express purpose of forcing registrants to move
from their homes, and which are so small, they will "barely have room for two jungle gyms, some
benches and a brick wall").
186. The case of Marc Fruge, who was convicted of strict liability statutory rape, serves as an
excellent example. See State v. Fruge, No. 2012 KA 0066, 2012 WL 5387360 (La. Ct. App. 2012)
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With schemes that overextend, the regulatory aim of sex offender
registration laws no longer appears rationally related to its original
purpose. As evidence of this, one need only consider the explosion of
registerable offenses post-Smith.'8 7 From an average of eight offenses
that triggered registration in the 1990s to more than forty offenses in
some states,' 88 modem sex offender registration laws reach offenders
who engage in sexual behavior that would not have been previously
considered predatory.' 8 9
Not only are registration schemes broader in scope, they are
categorically fixed without individualized assessment of those who may
fall outside its purview.190 As a consequence, registration laws capture
many child offenders who are not likely to reoffend. Justice Ginsburg
expressed such a concern when she wrote of the Alaskan sex offender
registration scheme: "[T]he Act has a legitimate civil purpose . . . . But

its scope notably exceeds this purpose. The Act applies to all convicted
sex offenders, without regard to their future dangerousness.""' This is
especially problematic for the child offender because SORNA demands
that child registrants convicted of certain offenses must register for
life.192
As a companion to this point, registerable offenses have been
reclassified-often without debate-as more serious than previously
determined.193 The effect has been to recast registrants as more
dangerous than their conviction warrants and to impose upon them
additional burdens that, according to Mendoza-Martinez's counsel, are
(affirming registration despite the concession by the State that the underage girl had misrepresented her
age in such a way as to give credibility to Fruge's claim that he believed she was of consenting age).
For other examples, see infra notes 196-197 and accompanying text.
187. See, e.g., Carpenter & Beverlin, supra note 57, at 1087-99. One recently added burden has
been legislation that prohibits offenders from using social media. See Doe v. Indiana, 705 F.3d 694 (7th
Cir. 2012) (overturning legislation that would have barred registrants from using social media websites
and services because the law was overbroad); accord State v. Packingham, 748 S.E.2d 146 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2013).
188. See, e.g., Carpenter & Beverlin, supra note 57, at 1081 (cataloging the changes in Indiana
and other states). For specific court commentary on the significant changes, see Wallace v. State, 905
N.E.2d 371, 375 (Ind. 2009) (tracing the increase of registerable offenses in Indiana); accord State v.
Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 8-11 (Me. 2009).
189. Carpenter& Beverlin, supra note 57, at 1081.
190. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 16911 (2011) (reclassifying registration based solely on the crimes
committed).
191. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 116 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
192. See 42 U.S.C. § 16911(8) (2011) (defining the term "convicted" to include "adjudicated
delinquent as a juvenile for that offense, but only if the offender is 14 years of age or older at the time of
the offense. . . ").
193. See, e.g., Lemmon v. Harris, 949 N.E.2d 803, 804-05 (Ind. 2011) (stating that the defendant,
who was originally required to register for ten years, was later notified that his conviction had been
reclassified to require registration for life); Wiesart v. Stewart, 665 S.E.2d 187, 187-88 (S.C. Ct. App.
2008) (chronicling the changes in registrant's classification).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol82/iss3/2

32

Carpenter: Against Juvenile Sex Offender Registration

2014]

AGAINST JUVENILE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION

779

excessive in light of their potential for reoffense.1 94
With the breadth of registration laws comes the rigid application of
those laws to all offenders. Categorical assessment suffers from
excessive legislation in that it does not address whether an individual
offender's behavior portends future dangerousness. This inflexibility
leads to absurd results as it did in J.L.'s case when, at fourteen, he was
required to register for life because he engaged in voluntary sexual
relations with his twelve-year-old girlfriend. 1 The automatic nature of
J.L.'s disposition highlights the danger of a conviction-based assessment
devoid of individualized risk assessment.
Absurd results that arise from automatic sex offender registration are
not limited to the disposition of child sex offenders. The move from
individualized risk assessment to conviction-based assessment has
impacted adult registration as well. Three cases stand out, and all for
the same reason: the inflexibility of the statute's construction leads to
mandatory registration for offenders who are not sexual predators.
In Rainer v. State, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed automatic sex
offender registration of an eighteen-year-old male drug buyer who
robbed his seventeen-year-old female drug dealer, even though he had
no sexual motive.1 96 According to the court, the statute required Rainer
to register as a sex offender because his crime involved a "child
victim. 19 7
With a similarly blind eye to the rationale for registration laws, Dean
Edgar Wiesart was required to register as a sex offender in South
Carolina for having been convicted of skinny-dipping in a hotel
swimming pool in Maryland twenty years earlier.98 His attempt to have
a hearing on whether he should have to register was rejected.' 9
Probably the most disturbing is Florida's punitive reaction to Grayson
A. who at eighteen had sex with his then-fifteen-year-old girlfriend who
194. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 116-17 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (criticizing that the "duration of the
reporting requirement is keyed not to any determination of a particular offender's risk of reoffending,
but to whether the offense of conviction qualified as aggravated").
195. In re J.L., 800 N.W.2d 720 (S.D. 2011).
196. Rainer v. State, 690 S.E.2d 827 (Ga. 2010).
197. Id. at 829-30 (holding that robbery of a minor triggers the requirement to register as a sex
offender under Georgia law). Cf U.S. v. W.B.H., 664 F.3d 848 (11 th Cir. 2011) (requiring defendant to
register as a sex offender in 2009 following conviction for conspiracy to violate drug laws because he
had been convicted of rape in 1987). But see State v. Robinson, 873 So. 2d 1205, 1217 (Fla. 2004)
(rejecting sex offender registration for person who stole a car with a sleeping baby inside, but who
prosecution conceded had no intent to commit a sexual offense upon the child). Id. at 1215 ("Although
the Legislature's concern for protecting our children from sexual predators may be reasonable, however,
the application of this statute to a defendant whom the State concedes did not commit a sexual offense is
not.").
198. Wiesart v. Stewart, 665 S.E.2d 187, 187-88 (S.C. Ct. App. 2008).
199. Id.
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became pregnant. 20 0 Grayson was convicted of "lewd and lascivious
molestation," imprisoned for two years, and required to register as a sex
offender for the rest of his life. 20 1 His marriage to his girlfriend did
nothing to ameliorate the situation. The toll of registration was
enormous: Grayson lost countless jobs, and because his wife was also
his victim, he was not allowed to live with her. Two children and
thirteen years later, Grayson was only freed of the burdens of
registration through political intervention.2 0 2 He was pardoned and
removed from the registry. 203
Despite the quickly changing landscape of sex offender registration
schemes, Smith remains the prevailing view that sex offender
registration laws are rationally related to their civil regulatory intent.204
However, in recognition of the significantly intrusive changes, a few
courts have concluded otherwise, finding instead that they are criminal
penalties subject to constitutional scrutiny under the Eighth

Amendment. 205

V. WHY REGISTRATION ISCRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
Originally, the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment was
intended to apply to the "imposition of inherently barbaric punishments

under all circumstances." 206 But as Justice O'Connor reminded us in
200. See RAISED ON THE REGISTRY, supra note 10, at 38. Grayson A. is a pseudonym for Virgil
Frank McCranie whose story made headline news because he was ultimately pardoned by Florida's
governor.
201. See Bill Kaczor, Crist Delays Decision on Florida 'Romeo-Juliet' Case, SOUTH FLORIDA
SUN-SENTINEL (June 11, 2009, 4:32 PM), http://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/localfloridalsfl-romeojuliet-sex-offender-061009,0,1939750.story.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. See, e.g., Doe v. Bredesen, 507 F.3d 998 (6th Cir. 2007) (relying on Smith throughout the
opinion to affirm registration as a civil regulation); accord U.S. v. Young, 585 F.3d 199, 204 n.21 (5th
Cir. 2009); U.S. v. Samuels, 543 F. Supp. 2d 669, 676 (E.D. Ky. 2008); State v. Henry, 228 P.3d 900,
904 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010).
205. See Starkey v. Okla. Dep't of Corrs., 305 P.3d 1004 (Okla. 2013) (rejecting retroactive
application of sex offender registration laws because they were deemed punitive in nature); Doe v. Dep't
of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 62 A.3d 123 (Md. 2013) (overturning Maryland's sex offender
registration schemes in a plurality opinion); State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108, 1113 (Ohio 2011)
(ruling that sections of the state's sex offender laws unconstitutionally increase the punishment for
crimes committed before the law took effect); Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 384 (Ind. 2009)
(concluding that Indiana's amended scheme violates Indiana's constitutional principles); State v.
Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 26 (Me. 2009) (determining that the amended registration schemes violate ex post
facto principles). In an interesting development, the district court in A.CL.U of Nev. v. Masto, 719 F.
Supp. 1258 (Nev. D. Ct. 2008), issued a permanent injunction over the implementation of Nevada's sex
offender registration laws, finding that the amendments violated ex post facto, due process, and double
jeopardy. That injunction was overturned by the 9th Circuit. See A.C.L.U. of Nev. v. Masto, 670 F.3d
1046 (9th Cir. 2012).
206. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59 (2010).
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Roper, "It is by now beyond serious dispute that the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition of 'cruel and unusual punishments' is not a
static command." 207
As interpretation of the clause evolved, barbaric punishments were
replaced with questions of proportionality of the punishment to the
crime. 208 However, the Eighth Amendment's essence remains that "[i]ts
very function is, at the margins, to prevent the majoritarian branches of
government from overreaching and enacting overly harsh
punishments." 209
Generally, there are two classifications of punishment to consider: the
nature of the offense and length of sentence or the characteristics of the
offender. 2 10 To prove that a punishment is cruel and unusual, a court
must first consider whether there is a national consensus against the
sentencing practice, and second, "in the exercise of its own independent
judgment, whether the punishment violates the constitution." 211
A. The National Consensus Against Juvenile Registration

Although national consensus overwhelmingly favors sex offender
registration laws,212 a national majority does not favor the registration of
children.2 13 Only in the last decade have sex offender registration
schemes exploded with an increased number of registerable offenses, 214
more intrusive registration burdens, 215 expanding reach of
notification,
introduction of residency restrictions, " and GPS
207. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 589 (2005) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
2 0 8. Id.
209. State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 53-54 (Iowa 2013).
210. In re C.P., 967 N.E.2d 729, 737 (Ohio 2012). See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407
(2008) (serving as an example of the analysis used involving the particular offense).
211. Graham, 560 U.S. at 61; see also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) (quoting
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977), for the proposition that even where there is legislative
consensus, "the Constitution contemplates that in the end [judicial] judgment will be brought to bear").
212. See, e.g., Carpenter & Beverlin, supra note 57, at 1076-1100 (tracking the explosion of sex
offender registration schemes around the country); see also Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 376 (N.J.
1995) (characterizing sex offender registration laws as a "national trend reflecting a national problem").
Sometimes, an absence can indicate a national consensus as well. See, e.g., Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2024
(2010) (relying on the rarity of juveniles sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility to
conclude that there was a national trend against such sentences).
213. See infra notes 224-225 and accompanying text.
214. See Carpenter & Beverlin, supra note 57, at 1081-86 (detailing the "dramatic increase" in
registration-worthy offenses since the 1990s); see also Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 375 (Ind.
2009) (tracing the increase of registerable offenses in Indiana); accord State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 811 (Me. 2009).
215. See Carpenter & Beverlin, supra note 57, at 1087-90 (describing the added burdens that
registrants face including the personal information required, length of registration, and whether inperson reporting is required).
216. Id. at 1090-95.
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tracking of registrants.2 18 The increase in scope and severity of these
laws reflect eagerness on the public's part, however ill-founded, to

embrace a system of control that it perceives will protect its citizens. 2 19
Given this climate, and despite the threat of loss of federal funding if
states do not comply with SORNA, 220 a number of states have rebelled
at compliance. 221 This reaction is all the more compelling when one
considers that there was overwhelming state support for the first
federally mandated sex offender registration laws passed in 1995.222
Several reasons emerge for the refusal. Specifically, states have
balked at requiring children in the juvenile court system to register as
sex offenders. 223 Refusal to comply is also about the expense. SORNA
comes with a hefty price tag.224 Texas state officials estimated it would
cost $38.7 million to comply with SORNA compared with a loss of only
$1.4 million in federal funding for noncompliance. 225 Finally, pushback
comes from the perceived loss of state control to craft registration

217. Id. at 1096-97.
218. 42 U.S.C. § 16981(a)(1)(A)(i) (2012) (permitting grants to states and local governments that
create programs to outfit sex offenders with electronic monitoring units). For examples of statutes that
have GPS monitoring programs, see ALA. CODE § 15-20A-20 (2013); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13902(G) (2013); CAL. PENAL CODE § 3004 (2013); FLA. STAT. § 947.1405(7) (2013); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 42-1-14 (2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-208.40B (2012).
219. See Carpenter,supra note 53, at 52-61 (exploring the emotionally-laden rhetoric that impels
passage of more punitive sex offender registration laws).
220. 42 U.S.C. § 16925 (2012) (stating that "for any fiscal year after the end of the period for
implementation, a jurisdiction that fails, as determined by the Attorney General, to substantially
implement this title shall not receive 10 percent of the funds that would otherwise be allocated for that
fiscal year to the jurisdiction under subpart I of part E of title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968"); 42 U.S.C. § 3750 (2012).
221. See infra note 227.
222. See 42 U.S.C. § 16925(a) (2012).
223. See Donna Lyons, Down to the Wire, STATE LEGISLATURES MAGAZINE, June 2011, at 26,
http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/magazine/articles/20 1/SL 0611at
27,
available
SexOffender.pdf (citing federal officials who reported that requiring juveniles to register is the "most
significant barrier" to compliance); see also In re C.P., 967 N.E.2d 729, 738 (Ohio 2012) (reviewing
some states' refusal to comply and federal response to the refusal).
224. Members of Congress have acknowledged the cost to implementing SORNA. See, e.g., 154
CONG. REC. S9349, 9352 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 2008) (statement of Sen. Cobum) ("We promised
everybody we would do it, but have barely funded it at all."), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2008-09-24/pdf/CREC-2008-09-24-ptl-PgS9352.pdf#page=l;
accord 154 CONG. REc. S4559, 4589 (daily ed. May 21, 2008) (Statement of Sen. Hatch)
("Unfortunately, many of the enforcement provisions in the Adam Walsh Act have not been funded."),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2008-05-21/pdf/CREC-2008-05-21-ptl-PgS45882.pdf#page-2; 155 Cong. Rec. E601, 611 (daily ed. Mar., 10, 2009) (statement of Rep. Smith)
("Unfortunately, many of the programs authorized by the Adam Walsh Act . .. have received
insufficient or no direct funding from Congress."), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC2009-03-10/pdflCREC-2009-03-10-ptl-PgE611-5.pdf#page=1.
225. See Lyons, supra note 223, at 26 (quoting Texas officials on their calculations of the cost of
SORNA).
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laws. 226
When one combines the reasons for failure to comply with SORNA,
the compliance statistics compiled by the General Accounting Office are
startling. By February 2013, only nineteen of the fifty-six jurisdictions
had substantially implemented SORNA, with only sixteen states
meeting compliance. 22 The Supreme Court of Ohio, in its review of the
national trend on the lack of compliance, aptly referred to it as "national

foot dragging." 2 28

The national trend to reject child sex offender registration is clear if
one isolates the statistics according to the reason for noncompliance.
Thirty-one of the fifty-two jurisdictions reported that the inclusion of
child registration was a hurdle to implementation of SORNA. Twenty
of those jurisdictions indicated it was a major challenge to
compliance. 229
Symbolic of the national consensus to resist child registration are
explanations by the states of Texas and New York for their refusal to
comply with SORNA. In a letter to the U.S. Department of Justice, the
General Counsel and Acting Chief of Staff of the Texas Governor wrote,
"In dealing with juvenile sex offenders, Texas law more appropriately
provides for judges to determine whether registration would be
beneficial to the community and the juvenile offender in a particular
case." 230
Similarly, from the State of New York, the Director of the Office of
Sex Offender Management wrote, "New York has a long standing
public policy of treating juvenile offenders differently from adult
226. See, e.g., id. ("Texas is one of the states that classify sex offenders and set their registration
requirements based on a risk assessment. SORNA, instead, has states using a three-tier classification
system based solely upon the offense.... [W]ork in Texas to narrow the sex offender registry to those
who are most likely to be dangerous would be undone by SORNA's rules.").
227. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-211, OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND
NOTIFICATION ACT: JURISDICTIONS FACE CHALLENGES TO IMPLEMENTING THE ACT AND
STAKEHOLDERS REPORT
POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE
EFFECTS 13
(2013),
available at

http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/652032.pdf; see also Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, Adam
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act: Compliance, NCSL.ORG (Aug.
1, 2013),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/adam-walsh-child-protection-and-safetyact.aspx (reporting compliance by the following jurisdictions: Alabama, Delaware, Florida, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, and Wyoming, and the United States territory of Guam, the Commonwealth
of Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands).
228. In re C.P., 967 N.E.2d 729, 739 (Ohio 2012).
229. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 227. See also No EASY ANSWERS,

supra note 5 (imploring states to refuse to comply with SORNA).
230. See Letter from Jeffery S. Boyd, General Counsel and Acting Chief of Staff for the Governor
of Texas, to Linda M. Baldwin, Director of the SMART Office in the Dept. of Justice, (Aug. 17, 2011),
available
at
http://mobile.ncleg.net/documentsites/committees/JLOCJPS/201 I 12%20Interim/October/o2013,%202011%2OMeeting/RD_SORNAGeneralInformation 2011-1013.pdf.
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offenders so that juveniles have the best opportunity of rehabilitation
and reintegration. The federal requirement that juveniles be placed on
the Sex Offender Registry under SORNA is in direct conflict with that
public policy." 23 1 Most recently, the State of Washington abolished
child sex offender registration completely. 232
B. Through the Lens ofIndependentJudicialReview
Whether national consensus favors a particular trend in sentencing is
only one aspect of the analysis. Separately, the court must entertain an
independent review of whether the sentence is cruel and unusual
punishment.2 33 On this point, one theme emerges: similar treatment of
child and adult offenders violates fundamental principles that require
sentencing practices to distinguish between the two groups of offenders.
1. The Flaw in Automatic Child Registration: One Size Does Not Fit All
Automatic conviction-based registration for adults may be grounded
in greater legitimacy than automatic conviction-based registration for
children. That is because of the obvious truth that children are different
from adults. A child's actions and accompanying reasoning cannot be
so easily classified. In this case, one size does not fit all.
As the Supreme Court wrote, a child's youth is far "more than a
chronological fact." 234 On how to give context to those words, the
Supreme Court trilogy of Roper, Graham,and Millerprovides important
guidance on the appropriate distinctions that must be drawn in the
treatment of adult and child offenders. At its heart, the trilogy signified
that sentencing practices must account for key distinctions that separate
adult and child offenders.
To determine whether the sentence of death was appropriate for a
juvenile, the Court in Roper isolated certain characteristics that
separated children from their adult counterparts. The first characteristic
is that children have a "lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of
responsibility." 235 Psychological research pertaining to child sex
offender registrants confirms that children and teenagers have a greater
231. Id.
232. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.540 (2013).
233. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
234. Id. at 2467 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982)); see also J.D.B. v.
North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2403 (2011); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005); Johnson v.
Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993).
235. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 ("In recognition of [their] comparative immaturity and
irresponsibility . . . almost every State prohibits those under 18 years of age from voting, serving on
juries, and marrying without parental consent.").
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tendency than adults to make decisions involving sexual conduct based
on emotions, such as anger or fear, rather than any2 V'redetermined trait
that predicts the child's future sexual dangerousness. 6
Additionally, the Court found that children are more vulnerable to
negative and external pressures,237 an important factor when one
considers that sexual offenses by children are often committed while in
groups.2 38 Because they are more susceptible to peer pressure, children
are also less able "to extricate themselves from a criminogenic
setting." 239

Finally, children do not have fully formed characters or identities.
With less fixed personality traits, children have the potential to mature
and form a settled identity. 240 Thus, there is great possibility for a child
"with even the most depraved characteristics to be rehabilitated." 24 1
Interestingly, these three traits not only impact a child's decisionmaking process of whether to initiate a sexual crime, these traits are as
likely the explanation for why children do not reoffend. Growth in
maturity, change in situational and environmental factors, and greater
impulse control all help to explain why child sex offenders have very
low recidivism rates.242
Unfortunately, the public's desire to compel child registration is
fueled by a faulty assumption that children who commit sexual offenses

are likely to reoffend as adults.243 Once a sex offender always a sex

offender. This assumption calls to mind a similar viewpoint regarding
the ability to forecast whether a child will become an adult serial
murderer. According to some psychological studies, adult serial
murderers demonstrate propensity to serial violence when they are
children because of certain behaviors they exhibited or environmental
factors they suffered.24 4
236. See RAISED ON THE REGISTRY, supranote 10, at 26.

237. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
238. See David Finkelhor, Richard Ormrod & Mark Chaffin, Juveniles Who Commit Sex Offenses
Against Minors, JUVENILE JUSTICE BULLETIN,
Dec.
2009,
at 4,
available at
http://www.unh.edu/ccrc/pdf/CVI71.pdf.
239. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. See, e.g., State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 55 (Iowa 2013) (Reiterating that "the science
establishes that for most youth, the qualities [that make them offend] are transient. That is to say, they
will age out.").
243. See supra note 129, infra note 248 and accompanying text.
244. See,
e.g.,
Serial
Killer
as
Child,
MACALESTER.EDU,
http://www.macalester.edu/psychology/whathap/UBNRP/serialkillers/childhood.html
(last accessed
May 7, 2014) (reporting on a study by FBI agents regarding common traits of 36 serial killers they
examined); see also Shirley Lynn Scott, What Makes Serial Killers Tick? CRIMELIBRARY,
http://www.trutv.comflibrary/crime/serial_killers/notorious/tick/events_5.html (last accessed May 7,
2014). However, even the view that serial murderers share common traits includes its share of myths.
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Although it is tempting to borrow a serial murderer model of
predictive analysis, it does not help determine future predatory behavior
of children who commit sexual offenses. Sadly, it only confuses the
discussion. 24 5 That is what social scientist David Burton concluded in
analyzing the results of an extensive database on sex offenders:
"[Registration schemes] assume that past offenders will be future
offenders. But when it comes to sexual offending, several decades of
research prove otherwise." 246 Dr. Michael Caldwell's work supports
this observation. 247 His review of 22 studies found a juvenile recidivism
rate of less than 5%. In one study of 11,219 juvenile sex offenders, the
mean sexual recidivism rate was slightly higher at 7% but was still six
times lower than the general recidivism rate of 43%.248 Dr. Caldwell's
conclusion: the data does not support any basis for singling out child sex
offenders as a subgroup of juvenile offenders. 249 Other studies similarly
have found that child sex offenders do not recidivate at the rates
imagined by the public, 250 and when children do reoffend, they likely do
so for motivations other than serial predatory tendencies.25 '
Individual stories confirm these findings. Even where a child's

See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, SERIAL MURDER: MULTI DISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES FOR

INVESTIGATORS (Robert J. Morton et al. eds., 2005) (debunking common myths about serial murderers),
available at http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/serial-murder. Sometimes fiction imitates
life. See JEFF LINDSAY, DARKLY DREAMING DEXTER (2004) (fictionalizing a serial killer whose
tendencies toward serial violence began at the age of two when he witnessed his mother's brutal killing).
245. The genesis of this confusion may have originated with a small study in which adult
offenders were asked whether they had offended as juveniles. See Leon, supra note 22, at 147
(describing the cross-sectional nature of the study).
246. Id. at 144.
247. Michael F. Caldwell, Juvenile Sex Offenders, in CHOOSING THE FUTURE FOR AMERICAN
JUVENILE JUSTICE (D. Tanenhaus & F. Zimring eds., 2014) (analyzing empirical data on juvenile sex
offenses to conclude that categorical assumptions about child offenders is not supported by the data).
248. Id at 7.
249. Id. at 10 ("In brief, juvenile sex offenders as a group appear to be no more likely to engage in
sexual violence than similar non-sex offending delinquents.").
250. See, e.g., INDIANA DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS, JUVENILE RECIDIVISM RATES (2008), available
at http://www.in.gov/idoc/files/2008JuvRecidivismRpt.pdf, (reporting that juvenile sex offenders in
Indiana were less likely to recidivate than nonsexual offenders); RICK MCELFRESH, JIAHUI YAN &
ANNE JANKU, JUVENILE OFFENDER RECIDIVISM REPORT 5 (2009) (finding that juvenile sex offenders
had the lowest rate of recidivism among juvenile offenders); Finkelhor, supra note 238; Bremer, supra
note 129, at 1087-88 (reporting statistics that confirm child offenders are not likely to reoffend).
251. See supranotes 129, 243 and accompanying text. Similar studies disprove this perception as
it pertains to adult offenders. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL OFFENDER STATISTICS,
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/crimoff.htm# (reporting that 5.3% of released sex offenders were
rearrested for another sex offense); accord Center for Sex Offender Management, Myths and Facts
About
Sex
Offenders,
DEP'T
OF
JUSTICE
(Mar.
9,
2014,
6:07
PM),
http://www.csom.org/pubs/mythsfacts.html (disputing myth of reoffense with statistics that suggest sex
offenders reoffend at lower rates). See also Doron Teichman, Sex, Shame, and the Law: An Economic
Perspective on Megan's Laws, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 355, 382-83 (2005) (refuting the simplistic way
recidivism rates are compiled).
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sexual act is nonconsensual, it does not necessarily signify future
dangerousness. In Joshua G.'s case, his act of inappropriately touching
his nine-year old sister was in direct response to his being repeatedly
raped between the ages of six and eight by neighborhood children.252
His inability to control the environment combined with his immaturity
led to his acting out. As he explains now, "Everything that I did with
my sister came directly from the things I had experienced in the abuse. I
was sexually confused, and it started to play out with my sister." 253
Given the low recidivism rates among child offenders, one sees the
inherent inequities of an automatic registration scheme that ensnares the
nonreoffending child with the small percentage of children who will
become sexual predators.2 54 On this point, the research is clear. A child
offender's actions are impelled by "more varied and more complicated"
reasons than the simplistic idea that the offender is a serial predator in
the making. 255
Noted scholar Professor Franklin Ziniring argues that empirical
evidence supports the proposition that child offenders do not fit a single
stereotypic model. He instructs that, at a minimum, they fall into three
general categories: "first-time offenders," who engage in force or
coercion, but who will generally not reoffend; "status offenders," who
engage in consensual, but unlawful, sexual activity with peers close in
age; and "repeat offenders," only a small percentage of whom will grow
into sexual predators.25 6
In addition to these three categories, sometimes unlawful sexual
activity by children is a matter of "opportunity and hormones." 257 A
sentiment, perhaps, that is embodied in the statement from Miller when
it expressed significant concerns with mandatory sentencing schemes
that did not take into account factors that are particular to children,
including a juvenile's "immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to
252. See Emily DePrang, Life on the List, TEXAS OBSERVER (May 31, 2012, 2:52 PM),
http://www.texasobserver.org/life-on-the-list.
253. Id.
254. Judging from one report, early adolescence is the peak age for offenses against younger
children. See Finkelhor,supra note 238 (reporting that offenses against teenagers "surge during mid to
late adolescence, while offenses against victims under age 12 decline"). These statistics create conflict
in SORNA's registration scheme because it requires child offenders fourteen years of age and older who
have committed the most serious of sexual offenses to register for life. See 42 U.S.C. § 16916(3)
(2012).
255. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AN AMERICAN TRAVESTY: LEGAL RESPONSES TO ADOLESCENT

SEX-OFFENDING (2004), available at http://www.adjj.org/downloads/4424American%2OTravesty.pdf
(arguing that first time child offenders should never have to register because the motivational factors are
too complex).
256. Id.
257. Suzanne Meiners-Levy, Challenging the Prosecution of Young "Sex Offenders": How
Developmental Psychology and the Lessons of Roper Should Inform Daily Practice, 79 TEMP. L. REV.
499, 506 (2006) (criticizing the assumption that child sexual behavior is always predatory).
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appreciate risks and consequences." 258
With such varied reasons for a child's commission of sexual acts, the
automatic categorical assessment, or a one-size-fits-all approach, is a
flawed model. 259 Rather than automatic conviction-based categorical
assessment that treats all child offenders alike, Professor Zinring argues
that we need to develop a solid database to predict the small subset of
juvenile offenders who will become future predators. 260
The State of Texas would agree. In refusing to comply with SORNA,
the State of Texas underscored the concern over categorical assessment
when it wrote, "Texas is one of the states that classify sex offenders and
set their registration requirements based on a risk assessment.... Work
in Texas to narrow the sex offender registry to those who are most likely
to be dangerous would be undone by SORNA's rules."26 1
The Supreme Court of Ohio's examination of automatic registration
in In re C.P. is also instructive on the issue. 262 Of great concern to the
court was that the child offender was automatically labeled a Tier III
offender for the commission of certain offenses.26 3 The court found that
"[this statutory requirement] changes the very nature of [a Serious
Youth Offender disposition], imposing an adult penalty immediately
upon the adjudication." 26
The court was also concerned that automatic registration precluded
exercise of discretion by juvenile court judges, which is critical to
ensuring the fairness of the proceedings. The court wrote, "The
disposition of a child is so different from the sentencing of an adult that
fundamental fairness to the child demands the unique expertise of a
juvenile judge." 265 The Supreme Court of Ohio has been joined by the
Supreme Court of Indiana. When faced with whether to condone the
automatic registration of a child offender, the Supreme Court of Indiana

258. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468 (2012).
259. See ZIMRING, supra note 255 (arguing that first time child offenders should never provide
the basis for registration).
260. Id The American Bar Association has also urged that Congress reexamine categorical
assessments under SORNA. See Sex Offender Notification and RegistrationAct (SORNA): Barriersto
Timely Compliance by States Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H
Comm. on The Judiciary, Illth Cong. 4 (2009) (statement by Anthony Joseph, Chair of Criminal
Justice Section of the American Bar Association) (urging that "juvenile court judges consider factors
relevant to the specific offense and the individual juvenile offender") available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/printers/l llth/l l 1-21_47923.pdf.
261. See Lyons, supra note 223, at 26.
262. See In re C.P., 967 N.E.2d 729 (Ohio 2012).
263. Id at 733-34 (explaining that public-registry-qualified juvenile offenders are automatically
labeled as Tier III sex offenders which triggers registration burdens even if the juvenile completes
faithfully the juvenile disposition).
264. Id. at 735.
265. See, e.g., In re CP., 967 N.E.2d at 748.
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concluded that the juvenile may not be placed on a sex offender registry
unless an evidentiary hearing is conducted and the juvenile judge finds
by clear and convincing evidence that the child is likely to reoffend.26 6
2. The Unconstitutionality of Lifetime Registration: Applying the
Trilogy of Roper, Graham,and Miller to Mandatory Lifetime
Registration
Assuming mandatory registration of children continues to survive
constitutional scrutiny, the question remains whether mandatory lifetime
registration survives as well. To explore this issue, it is helpful to
consider recent Supreme Court decisions concerning juvenile
sentencing. In declaring life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole unconstitutional in nonhomicide cases, Graham v. Florida stated
that this sentence reflects "an irrevocable judgment about [an
offender's] value and place in society," which is at odds with a child's
capacity for change. 26 When Miller v. Alabama established a "flat ban
on life without parole," 268 its reasoning, combined with the analysis in
Graham, offered the potential to consider the two cases in a broader
context. The language in Miller invites such an examination. There, the
Court wrote, "The mandatory penalty scheme [of life without
parole] ... contravenes Graham and also Roper's foundational principle

that imposition of a State's most severe penalties on juvenile offenders
cannot proceed as though they were not children."2 69
The question, therefore, is whether mandatory lifetime registration
shares sufficiently similar attributes to life without parole to fall within
the Graham/Miller ambit. 2 70 Does a state's imposition of lifetime
registration on children in the same manner as on adult offenders violate
the principles of Graham and Miller, which require that any sentencing
practice take into account the distinctions between adults and children?
Jurisprudence surrounding the Graham/Miller prohibition has only
begun to develop. However, there is already growing tension over
whether the opinions should be read to create a limited categorical ban
on a small subset of sentences, or whether the Court has invited a

266. See N.L. v. State, 989 N.E.2d 773 (Ind. 2013).
267. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010). See generally Cara H. Drinan, Graham on
the Ground, 87 WASH. L. REv. 51, 54, 62-63 (2012).
268. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012).
269. Id. at 2458.
270. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:7-2(g) (West 2008) ("A person required to register under this
section who has been ... adjudicated delinquent ... for more than one sex offense ... or who has
been... adjudicated delinquent. .. for aggravated sexual assault pursuant to [certain crimes] is not
eligible . .. to make application .. . to terminate the registration obligation.").
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broader interpretation of the prohibition.2 7'
Assuming Graham and Miller can be read more broadly, there is still
work to be done to make the analogy fit mandatory registration for life.
Two major obstacles stand in the way. The first obstacle, whether sex
offender registration is akin to a prison sentence, has been addressed
earlier in this Article. The second obstacle, which has not yet been
addressed, is whether mandatory lifetime registration is the functional
equivalent of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. For
this examination, the Court's cautionary language in Graham is
particularly instructive: juveniles should be given "some meaningful
opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and
rehabilitation." 272
Whether a particular sentence affords a juvenile some meaningful
opportunity for release surfaces in cases where a juvenile has been given
a sentence that extends beyond life expectancy, or where sentences are
stacked upon each other. Consider, for example, People v. Caballero,
where a sixteen-year-old gang member who opened fire on three rival
gang members was convicted of three counts of attempted murder. 273
With firearm enhancements attached to each attempted murder
conviction and with each sentence stacked consecutively by the trial
court, the aggregate sentence amounted to 110 years.274 In overturning
the sentence because it violated the principles of Graham,2 7 5 the court
found that the length of the sentence denied the defendant the
"opportunity to 'demonstrate growth and maturity' to try to secure his
release."276
Sometimes determining whether a sentence is the 'function
equivalent' is not nearly as obvious. In State v. Null, rather than facing

271. Compare State v. Brown, 118 So. 3d 332 (La. 2013) (rejecting contention that multiple
sentences that exceeded the life expectancy of defendant violated Graham) with State v Null, 836
N.W.2d 41, 71 (Iowa 2013) (holding that 52.5 year sentence did not provide meaningful opportunity for
juvenile's release during his lifetime). Justice Alito's dissenting words in Grahammight offer support
for a narrow reading of Graham when he stated: "[N]othing in the Court's opinion affects the imposition
of a sentence to a term of years without the possibility of parole." Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2058 (Alito, J.,
dissenting).
272. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030.
273. People v. Caballero, 282 P.3d 293, 265 (Cal. 2012).
274. Id.
275. Id. at268.
276. Id. See also Moore v. Biter, 725 F.3d 1184, 1129 (9th Cir. 2013) (overturning a 254 year
sentence because it meant that "Moore must live the remainder of his life in prison, knowing that he is
guaranteed to die in prison regardless of his remorse, reflection, or growth"); Floyd v. State, 87 So. 3d
45 (Fla. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that consecutive forty year sentences was the functional equivalent of
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole under Graham). But see Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d
546 (6th Cir. 2012) (ruling that Ohio was free under Graham to uphold stacked sentence that extended
beyond juvenile's life).
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110 years, the sixteen-year-old offender faced a 52.5 year sentence. 277
The Iowa Supreme Court reasoned that the spirit of Roper, Graham, and
Miller necessitated a reading beyond their narrow applications. 278 it
concluded that a sentence of 52.5 years was the functional equivalent of
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole because of the
unlikelihood that the sixteen-year-old offender would see the
opportunity for release in his lifetime, or if released, he would be at such
an advanced age. 279
Can the same rationale underlying Caballero and Null be extended to
mandatory lifetime registration? Although the trilogy of Roper,
Graham, and Miller pertained to sentencing practices, the Court's
evaluation of the appropriateness of those sentences applies equally to
mandatory lifetime registration of child sex offenders. Mandatory
lifetime sex offender registration shares many of the same
characteristics of the sentences that caused concern in Graham,
Caballero,and Null.
Like those punishments, lifetime sex offender registration is an
irrevocable judgment devoid of rehabilitative hope. This observation is
not dramatic license. It gives credence to the feelings shared by child
registrants who feel the hopelessness and despair arising from their
registration and the bleakness they experience in their future. 280
The observation also precisely describes the sanctioned practice of
requiring lifetime sex offender registration for an eleven-year-old boy,
which was upheld in In re J.R.Z.2 8' Such judgment of an eleven-yearold boy shows that the system never intended to offer the child
rehabilitative hope. In fact, this was the central point of the Supreme
Court of Ohio's decision in In re C.P. when it overturned mandatory
lifetime registration for child offenders under the rationale of
Graham.282 The court reasoned that no penalogical justification exists
for the imposition of such a harsh penalty on a child, for whom such a
pronouncement "will define his adult life before it has a chance to truly

277. State v Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 71 (Iowa 2013).
278. Id. (providing extensive analysis of Roper, Graham, and Miller throughout the opinion on
whether a 52.5 year sentence was constitutional).
279. Id. at 71 (employing statistical evidence on the life expectancy of young male offenders).
280. See generally RAISED ON THE REGISTRY, supranote 10 (collecting stories involving the lives
of child registrants).
281. 648 N.W.2d 241 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (upholding registration of eleven year old); see also
In re J.W., 787 N.E.2d 747 (Ill. 2003) (concluding that lifetime registration for a twelve year old was
constitutional because "there is a rational relationship between the registration of juvenile sex offenders
and the protection of the public from such offenders").
282. In re C.P., 967 N.E.2d 729, 742--44 (Ohio 2012) (employing Graham principles to reject
penalogical justification for mandatory lifetime registration). This reasoning was echoed by the trial
court in In reJ.B., No. CP-67-JV-0000726-2010, at 35-36 (Penn. Ct. Com. Pl. Nov. 4, 2013).
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begin." 283
Mandatory lifetime registration for children also evokes Miller's
warning that to be considered constitutional, harsh punishments must
arise from sentencing practices that consider the differences between
The lack of discretion to consider differences
adults and children.2
between adult and child offenders is at odds with the core reasoning of
Grahamand Miller.
Mandatory lifetime registration also does not provide an avenue for
the child to show eligibility for removal from the registry.2 85 Even
where an avenue for removal is statutoril' authorized, the mechanism in
place makes it very difficult to do so. 86 In that regard, the words
"meaningful opportunity," 287 from Graham, take on special importance.
As the Louisiana Supreme Court reasoned in State v. Dyer when it
deleted the statutorily imposed restriction on parole eligibility,
"meaningful opportunity" under Graham cannot be based on an ad hoc
decision-making process. 288
One is also reminded that removal from the registry can never fully
remove the stigma. The case of one child registrant serves as an
example. He committed suicide only months after being removed from
the registry,289 an act his mother explained in the following way,
"Everyone in the community knew he was on the sex offender registry,
it didn't matter to them that he was removed." 290
283. In re C.P., 967 N.E.2d at 742.
284. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2458 (2012). See also id. at 2468 ("[I]n imposing a
State's harshest penalties, a sentencer misses too much if he treats every child as an adult.").
285. See, e.g., In re Z.B., 757 N.W.2d 595, 597 (S.D. 2008) (overturning South Dakota law that
required a child registrant to remain on the sex offender registry for life without the possibility of
removal). For a sampling of states that do not offer mechanisms for removal see COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 16-22-111 (2011); FLA. STAT. §§ 943.0435( ll)(a)(3), 943.04354 (2011); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 34-A,
§§ 11221, 11225-A (2011); TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 62.101 (2009).
286. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 943.0435(11) (2013) (stating that a juvenile sex offender must register
for life unless receiving a full pardon or the conviction is set aside in a later proceeding, or unless the
offender has been released for at least 25 years and has not been arrested since release, at which point
the court may either grant or deny relief); see also IND. CODE § 1I-8-8-22(d)-(k) (2013) (noting that a
person may petition a court for removal of the designation as an offender and for removal of all personal
information from the public registry website by filing a petition in the appropriate court, and that the
court may summarily deny the petition or give notice to the appropriate authorities to set the matter for
hearing).
287. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010).
288. State v. Dyer, 77 So. 3d 928 (La. 2011). But see Angel v. Virginia, 794 S.E.2d 386 (Va.
2011) (construing its conditional release provisions to offer a meaningful opportunity for release as
required by Graham).
289. See also Michael Barajas, In Texas, Juvenile Sex Offenders Get Virtual Life Sentence, SAN
ANTONIO CURRENT (May 8, 2013), http://sacurrent.com/news/in-texas-juvenile-sex-offenders-getvirtual-life-sentence-1.1484813 (discussing the impact of sex offender registration laws on a young man
who committed suicide months after he was removed from the registry).
290. Id.
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At first blush, registration may not seem to fit the parameters of life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole. But on further
reflection, one cannot escape the conclusion that mandatory registration
for life shares sufficiently similar features, and thus, lifetime registration
for child offenders is unconstitutional under the reasoning of Graham
and Miller.
VI. CONCLUSION

Scrutiny of child sex offender registration laws places front and
center the issue of what it means to judge our children. And on that
issue, we are failing. The public's desire to punish children appears
fixed despite our understanding that child sexual offenders pose little
danger of recidivism, possess diminished culpability, and have the
capacity for rehabilitation.
The best avenue for change resides in the courts' reexamination of the
constitutionality of such practices. This Article has demonstrated that at
least one constitutional challenge is viable: child sex offender
registration laws are unconstitutionally punitive under the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
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